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Introduction1
Five years before the outbreak of the U.S.-Mexican War, one of the wealthiest patriarchs,
or patrones, of Nuevo México sent his eight-year-old son, José Francisco, to obtain an English
education in St. Louis, Missouri. He advised his child, “The heretics are going to overrun all this
country. Go and learn their language and come back prepared to defend your people.” 2 In 1861,
that child became U.S. Lieutenant Colonel J.F. Chavez, a key participant in the U.S. Civil War in
New Mexico. Before his assassination in 1904, Chavez served as a lead officer in the Apache

1

Throughout this work I have made every effort to provide Spanish primary source quotations in the original
language either in parentheses or a footnote. The major exception to this rule is the memoir of Rafael Chacón, for
which I was only able to obtain and work with Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa’s English translation. For all other
sources unless otherwise noted, I offer my own English translation alongside the original text. It is important to note
that the distinction between English and Spanish in nineteenth-century New Mexico were often blurred, with each
language influencing the vocabularies and grammar of the other. I did not wish to alter this important linguistic fact
by deciding what should or should not be translated in a mixed-language sentence, so in these cases I leave the
sentence as is, and offer single translations of Spanish words in parentheses.
2

Recorded by Ralph Emerson Twitchell (1912), quoted in “José Francisco Chavez”, Hispanic Americans in
Congress 1822-1995, Library of Congress, January 1, 1995, http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/congress/Chavez.html.
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and Navajo campaigns, congressional delegate for the territory, district attorney, and state
historian. He became highly involved in both local and federal post-war politics by intentionally
positioning himself as both Mexican and American, Hispanic and Anglo in order maintain his
culturally specific, inherited status as a patrón. This status, simultaneously economic, social and
political, was contingent upon to the unique history and culture of Hispanic New Mexico. A
patrón’s economic wealth derived from his inherited Spanish land grant. The labor of peones
(“peons”) tied to their patrón’s land by both debt and social obligations made this land
profitable. Socially, patrones secured power and masculine honor through patriarchal
dominance over, as well as magnanimity towards, the women, children, and less powerful men
within their extended kinship networks. 3 As scholar James Brooks has shown, patriarchal
dominance also manifested violently in the Southwestern borderlands practice of capturing and
enslaving American Indian women and children. Native patriarchs likewise sought affirmation
of their own status through the capture of Hispanic New Mexicans. 4 Politically, the role of a
patrón required what J.F. Chavez’s father asked of his son at such as early age: to lead, protect,
and advocate for his Hispanic New Mexican5 community — “his people.”

3

For an economic examination of the duties of a New Mexican patrón, see Maria E. Montoya, "Chapter 2:
Regulating Land, Labor, and Bodies: Mexican Married Women, Peones, and the Remains of Feudalism" in
Translating Property : The Maxwell Land Grant and the Conflict over Land in the American West, 1840-1900
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 46-78.
4

James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), esp. 8-9, 19-26.
5

I have intentionally chosen to use the terms “Hispanic New Mexican” and “Nuevo Mexicano” throughout this
project, rather than the contemporary “Latina/o/x” or the wordier “New Mexicans of Spanish-Mexican descent”,
because the Spanish-speaking elite of New Mexico on whom this essay focuses consistently affirmed and acted
upon their identities as descendants of Spanish conquistadors, viceroys, etc. often to minimize any indigenous
ancestry. I avoid referring to these Spanish-descended residents of the New Mexico territory as simply “Hispanics”
or “New Mexicans.” The first term is imprecise: “Hispanic” could include the Spanish-speaking people of other
states, such as Texas or California. The second is similarly broad: the English demonym “New Mexican” may be
applied to any resident of the territory, regardless of linguistic, ethnic, or racial identity.
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The other subject of this work, Nicolás de Jesús Pino, resided in three different countries
during his lifetime but never once lived outside the territory of New Mexico. Like Chavez,
Pino’s family occupied a high-status position as landed elite patrones of their local Hispanic
community in Santa Fe throughout the nineteenth century. Nicolás Pino was already a forty
year-old veteran of armed conflict and of territorial politics at the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War,
a member of the older generation of Hispanic New Mexican elites who spoke only Spanish and
did not seek out interactions with Anglo outsiders.6 Born in Santa Fe in 1819, he was barely two
years-old when Mexico gained its independence from Spain and twenty-seven when he helped
plot an overthrow of the U.S. military government during the U.S.-Mexican War. 7 During the
U.S. Civil War, Pino served as an officer of the Second New Mexico Militia, only to become a
prisoner of the Confederacy. After the Union victory, he returned to traditional hacienda
lifestyle and remained somewhat isolated from Anglo-American society. 8

In this way Nicolás

Pino negotiated warfare, changes in nationality, and cultural shifts in ways that protected his
socioeconomic status. Unlike Chavez, Pino stayed mostly separate from large-scale AngloAmerican politics after the U.S. Civil War, maintaining his social power on a local rather than
territorial scale. The difference between his path and that of Chavez prompts a comparative

6

I conclude this given that no English documents written by Nicolás Pino could be found; he always sought a
translator in military and legal affairs. In the one document written in his own hand, his military pension request,
Pino used Spanish grammar and prepositions rather than the English provided on the form.
7

Birth year from New Mexico State Archives & Records Center AASF, Santa Fe Baptisms, Reel 16, Frame 402.
New Mexico State Archives hereafter abbreviated to “NMSA”. Participation in the U.S.-Mexican War from
"United States Mexican War Pension Index, 1887-1926," FamilySearch, updated 4 December 2014, “Nicholas Pino,
1890”; citing Pension, New Mexico, NARA microfilm publication T317 (Washington D.C.: NARA); FHL
microfilm 537,009.
8

Record of Appointment of Postmasters, 1832-1971, NARA Microfilm Publication, M841, 145 rolls, Records of the
Post Office Department, Record Group Number 28 (Washington, D.C.: NARA). Appointments of U. S.
Postmasters, 1832-1971, Ancestry.com database.
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examination between the two men’s actions as high-status members of the increasingly colonized
society of Hispanic New Mexico.
This project works to uncover the adaptation of the Nuevo Mexicano elite to their shifting
geographic and political location during the nineteenth century through the microhistorical lense
of two individuals, José Francisco (J.F. or J. Francisco) Chavez and Nicolás Pino, who were
patrones of wealth and influence throughout their lives. It moves beyond establishing the
existence of Nuevo Mexicano Union soldiers—which Jerry Thompson accomplished in his 2015
A Civil War History of the New Mexico Volunteers and Militia—and toward understanding what
social, economic, and political realities motivated the actions of the Hispanic New Mexican
landed elite (or ricos) during moments of crisis such as the U.S.-Mexican and U.S. Civil War. I
argue that the reconstructed biographies of J.F. Chavez and Nicolás Pino demonstrate that this
uniquely positioned Hispanic New Mexican elite simultaneously resisted and adapted to political
upheavals in New Mexico in order to maintain their culturally contingent socio-economic status
as patrones.
To construct an argument about this rico community, however, is not a simple task in a
territory that was, through the first half of the nineteenth century, largely illiterate. 9 The
peripheral position New Mexico occupies in traditional North American histories of the
nineteenth century compounds this difficulty. In fact, only one lengthy firsthand Nuevo
Mexicano account of this period, the diary of Rafael Chacón, has been found and published. The
lack of pre-1900 Nuevo Mexicano primary sources has allowed historians to generalize about a

9

Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa describes New Mexico in the first half of the nineteenth century as “an educational
wasteland” in her annotations of Rafael Chacón’s diary. See Rafael Chacón, Legacy of Honor: The Life of Rafael
Chacón, a Nineteenth-Century New Mexican edited by Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1986), 47.
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varied polity of sixty- to seventy-thousand Hispanic New Mexicans rather than acknowledging
the multiple, often contradictory opinions and identities held within one community and even
within one individual.
The microhistorical method I propose complicates these generalizations, providing
greater understanding of the complexities of the unruly macrohistory of nineteenth century North
America, rather than proposing a macro-scale theory into which Hispanic New Mexico must be
inserted.10 I adopt a theoretical framework that takes its greatest inspirations from two sources.
Firstly, I use principles of Italian microhistorian Carlos Ginzburg’s biographical effort “to extend
the historic concept of ‘individual’ in the direction of the lower classes” in order to distinguish
individual personalities among what history has constructed as “indistinct masses.” 11 Though
Nicolás Pino and J.F. Chavez were highly influential in their local communities, they become
indistinguishable parts of a monolithic “New Mexican” or “Hispanic” mass in much scholarship
of the nineteenth century.12 Microhistorical study of these men as individuals helps to avoid
painting all of Hispanic New Mexico with this broad brush. These two protagonists also find

10

This is particularly evident in Civil War scholarship, where Hispanic New Mexico often adopts the author’s
opinion on the war. Scholars sympathetic to the Union such as Thompson and Wilson write “the
native Spanish-speaking population of New Mexico...was apathetic toward the South at best
and decidedly Unionist at worst” (Jerry Thompson and John P. Wilson, introduction to The Civil War in West Texas
and New Mexico: the Lost Letterbook of Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley by Henry Hopkins Sibley [El
Paso:Texas Western Press, 2001], 4). By contrast, Confederate-leaning historians like Texan Donald Frazier
argue, “Hispanics in the Southwest seemed receptive to secession overtures. Even if not
genuinely cooperative, they were at least indifferent” (Donald S. Frazier, Blood & Treasure: Confederate Empire in
the Southwest, 1st ed. [College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995], 15).
11

Carlos Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller, trans. John and Anne
Tedeschi, 2013 English edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), xxvii.
12

E.g. Agnes Laut characterizes all “Spanish ranchers” as holding the same opinion on rail building: “The Spanish
ranchers were glad or indifferent. They saw Americano changes blocked” (Agnes Laut, Pilgrims of the Santa Fe
[New York: Grosslet & Dunlap, 1931], 356); Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz claims that as early as the 1820s, an
undifferentiated “elite of Mexico’s northern provinces became parties to US objectives of incorporating the territory
into the United States” (An Indigenous Peoples History of the United States [Boston: Beacon Press, 2014], 12).
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common ground with the sixteenth-century subject of Ginzburg’s study in that their “small place
in [their] world...wasn’t negligible”, but has been rendered as such in macrohistorical study. 13
Secondly, I adapt much of Mexican microhistorian Luís González’s method for
reconstructing the history of individual villages to the comparatively small, interconnected
community of a few thousand Nuevo Mexicano landed elite. As González has written about
Mexican villages, this community “se sabe una y distinta (knows it is singular and distinct)”
within the vast mosaic of North America.14 It is this group’s dissimilarity from other North
American landed elites and its refusal to fit inside a homogeneous U.S. historical narrative that
merits its study. I deploy Ginzburg’s approach to studying specific individuals in order to reveal
the contours of this small, distinct rico community using the stories of my two subjects. In
telling their stories, I follow Ginzburg’s advice “that the obstacles interfering with research in the
form of lacunae or misrepresentations in the sources must become part of the account.” 15 That is
to say, I acknowledge the difficulties of researching two people whose histories have been
fragmented, misrepresented, and scattered. There are years during which I can only guess at
Pino or Chavez’s whereabouts and motivations. This uncertainty, too, must be part of the
narrative.
I chose specifically Pino and Chavez, rather than any of the dozen or so upper-class
Hispanic New Mexican patrones whose names have survived, for three key reasons. Firstly,
both had deep roots in the most established population centers of elite Nuevo Mexicano society:

13

Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms, 1.

14

Luis González, “Introducción a un libro de microhistoria”, Diálogos: Artes, Letras, Ciencias humanas 4.4 (1968),
24.
15

Carlos Ginzburg, “Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know About It”, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi,
Critical Inquiry 20.1 (October 1, 1993), 28.
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Nicolás Pino was a lifelong resident of Santa Fe, while J.F. Chavez was born in and spent much
of his life near Albuquerque in Bernalillo County. Their fathers and grandfathers were patrones
who dominated local politics from their hacienda (ranch) built on land given to their forefathers
by the Spanish crown.16 As such, Pino and Chavez made their primary residences on or near
these ancestral land grants. Their longstanding positions within two vital rico settlements allow
me to more easily connect their stories with broader trends in these communities. Even as they
maintained roots in northern New Mexico, both frequently crossed state and national borders to
regions as distant as New York or as close as Chihuahua, Mexico. Their movement suggests
how this specific elite community may have responded to macro-scale geopolitical
developments, such as new international borders.
Secondly, both men followed a similar general pattern in their careers—movement from
private life before the U.S. Civil War into local and/or federal politics afterwards—but achieved
varying degrees of political influence and integration with the encroaching Anglo-American
society. This helps identify what skills helped or hindered Hispanic New Mexican in interacting
with increasingly Anglo dominated systems of power. Language immediately emerges in their
stories as one such skill. As a member of an older, more isolationist generation, Nicolás Pino
does not appear to have spoken or written English; this fact required him to rely on his brothers,
Facundo and Miguel, to translate for him in legal and military settings. 17 In contrast, the younger
J.F. Chavez’ bilingualism positioned him as an impromptu interpreter for Nuevo Mexicanos in

16

Joséph P. Sanchez, Robert L Spude and Arthur R Gomez, New Mexico: A History (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2014), 124; Montoya, 46-48.
17

Facundo Pino is listed as “agent of Nicolás Pino” and signature of all of Nicolás Pino’s appeals in the court case
Spencer & Grandjean vs. Nicolás Pino (1853), District Court Records for Santa Fe County, Serial 19662. Box 95,
Series V, Folder 34, no. 518-520 (Santa Fe: NMSA).
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several official venues.18 J.F. Chavez enjoyed such a prodigious career in New Mexican
government following the Civil War that the constitutional convention of New Mexico named
“Chaves County” for him in 1889,19 while Nicolás Pino has faded into relative obscurity.
Finally, both men commanded enough socio-economic privilege in Nuevo Mexicano
society to leave an archival paper trail that includes legal cases, military correspondence, census
records, genealogies, anecdotes from Anglo-American visitors, and newspaper articles. I
acknowledge that reliance on the archive leaves as many silences as it fills, particularly in the
case of socially stratified and, until the turn of the century, largely illiterate New Mexico. Pino
and Chavez’s peons, the American Indians they held as slaves, and their female family members
leave sparse, obfuscated footprints in written documentation. I do my best to highlight their
obscured stories when they appear, but recognize that I cannot tell their full stories with the
historical documents I collected.
Where existing scholarship on New Mexico often divorces the U.S.-Mexican War or
Civil War-years from the pre-existing socio-political context of the territory, 20 my work treats the
broad stories of its two subjects as fundamental to understanding the actions taken by members
of the Nuevo Mexicano upper class during these moments of violent disruption. To that end, I
move chronologically through the lives of Pino and Chavez, placing special emphasis on their
interactions with political and military power during periods of tumultuous change. The

18

According to Rafael Chacón, Chavez translated Chacón’s patriotic speech at the camp of Ojo del Pescado in
November, 1863. See Chacón ed. Meketa, 249.
19

Mark Thompson, "Who Killed José Francisco Chavez?", New Mexico Office of the State Historian website,
accessed Jan 21, 2018, http://newmexicohistory.org/people/who-killed-José-francisco-chaves.
20

For example: Frazier, Blood & Treasure; Ray Charles Colton, The Civil War in the Western Territories: Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah (1959); Martin H. Hall, "Native Mexican Relations in Confederate Arizona, 18611862", The Journal of Arizona History 8.3 (Oct 1, 1967): 171-178.

Hannigan 10

narrative does not start or end with either war because the lives of Nicolás Pino and J.F. Chavez
did not start or end with them. Instead, these are two stories about the lifelong efforts of two
men to maintain a uniquely Nuevo Mexicano elite identity in what they considered to be their
country, even as that country was increasingly overrun.

I. “A populace of soldiers”, 1819 - 1848. 21
Between 1821 and 1848, three different Western empires claimed the lands bounded
roughly by the Colorado River on the west, the highest peaks of the Rocky Mountains on the
north, the flat plains of modern-day Texas on the east, and the southern vein of the Rio Grande
on the south: the region known since the founding of its first Spanish settlement in 1598 as
“Nuevo México.”22 The province’s arid desert in the south, difficult mountainous terrain in the
northeast, landlocked borders, and lack of extractable gold resources relegated Nuevo México to
an isolated backwater of the Spanish empire, governed primarily by its own small group of elites
far from the centers of imperial control. The circumstances of New Mexico’s earliest
colonization thus gave rise to the unique patrón tradition within which Pino and Chavez situated
themselves.
Most essential to the development of Hispanic New Mexican society were the dozens of
American Indian peoples who dwelled in the Southwest, some of whom claimed roots in Nuevo

21

From Chacón ed. Meketa, 185-186: “They [Hispanic New Mexicans] have fought and died, always with the faith
that it was necessary for them to defend their hearths...they soon raised among their sons a populace of soldiers by
nature intelligent, intrepid, valiant, and lovers of their country and of liberty.”
22

Early colonial history of the region from John Francis Bannon, The Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1513-1821 (
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1970), 5-48. For a non-Western empire’s claim to this land both before
and after this period, see Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
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México that stretched back to 2100 B.C.E. Among them were the various Pueblo communities
along the northern Rio Grande, the powerful Comanche Empire in the Plains to the west,
numerous Apache groups in the territory’s south, and the Diné (Navajo) in the canyons and
mountains to the northwest. The Diné, Zuñi Pueblo, Jicarilla Apache, and Mescalero nations still
exist on federal reservation territory within the present-day U.S. state of New Mexico. 23 These
indigenous peoples were central to the political, economic, and military identity of Hispanic New
Mexico for all its history. While the Pueblo peoples had settled in sedentary agricultural
communities with mixed Hispanic and indigenous populations by the nineteenth century, Navajo
and Apache communities remained largely autonomous in their politics and economies. Both
subsisted on a mix of agriculture, trade with Nuevo Mexicanos, and what one Union officer
classified as “depredations” on Hispanic New Mexican settlements. 24
For decades prior to the U.S. annexation of the territory, Native leaders like Mangas
Coloradas of the Chiricahua Apaches engaged in conflict with the Mexican government and its
settlements. Mangas Coloradas and his forces fought against the seizure of land and the murder
of Apache men for scalp bounties, often playing U.S. and Mexican interests against each other
through treaty-making in order to secure the greatest degree of safety and autonomy for his
people.25 Navajo groups, concentrated in the northern part of the territory, had also operated
under conditions of intermittent warfare and peacemaking with the Spanish and Mexican

23

Dunbar-Ortiz, 11-12, 21-23. For a map of American Indian lands circa 1780, see Brooks, Captives and Cousins,
41.
24

See Lt. Col. J.H. Eaton, “Description of the True State and Character of the Tribes of New Mexico,” August 3,
1853, in Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes
of the United States, vol. 4, ed. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo and Co., 1857) for one
such pre-war report.
25

Edwin R. Sweeney, “Mangas Coloradas”, American National Biography online, Oxford University Press,
February 2000, https://doi.org/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.2000627, accessed March 14, 2018.
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governments as well other American Indian nations for centuries. One Navajo leader, Zarcillos
Largos, complained of the intrusion of U.S. outsiders into this longstanding conflict during U.S.
annexation, classifying it as, “a war we had begun long before you [Americans] got here.” 26
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, they continued to retaliate against raids on their
communities by Hispanic New Mexicans as well as Comanches and fight the expropriation of
their land by U.S. policies.
Nuevo Mexicanos also saw the centuries-old conflict between themselves and indigenous
peoples as essential in shaping their unique identity. For this reason, diarist Rafael Chacón
proudly called his people “a populace of soldiers.” 27 From the earliest days of settlement, the
patrones led this populace in its conflict, negotiation, and warfare with Native groups.
Following the establishment of the first Spanish outpost in 1598, a small population of Spanish
criollos and mestizos (approximately 3,000 in 1700) settled the province throughout the 17th and
18th centuries; it was to these first Spanish settlers that the Hispanic New Mexican elites traced
their origins.28 From its inception, the resource-poor, landlocked Nuevo México stood at the
fringes of Spanish imperial control. In the absence of Spanish bureaucratic and military power,
the original conquistador families that composed the rico class came to govern local affairs,
particularly relationships with Native peoples, independent of a centralized state. 29
Consequently, Nuevo Mexicanos developed their own forms of intercultural violence and
exchange with indigenous groups; these included religious and economic transfer, treaty-making,

26

Zarcillos Largos, 1846, quoted in Peter Iverson, Diné: a History of the Navajos 1st edition (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 39.
27

Chacón ed. Meketa, 185.

28

Robert Galgano, Feast of Souls: Indians and Spaniards in the Seventeenth-Century Missions of Florida and New
Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 2.
29

On New Mexico’s “relatively long freedom from control by western centers of power,” see Brooks, 32-33.
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human captive exchange and enslavement, and more traditional acts of war, such as militia raids.
Without royally appointed bureaucrats, the responsibility for providing the leadership and
material resources necessary to carry out warfare or diplomacy with American Indians fell to the
wealthiest men of the community, the patrones. The patrón’s role in conflict solidified by the
nineteenth century as not only vital to the survival of their communities, but as the highest
expression of the masculine honor that undergirded their socio-economic status.
The prominent families of New Mexico—including the Chavez and Pino lineages—
claimed their origins in these early conquistador-settlers, inheriting the privileges and
responsibilities of patronismo from
them. A 1920 letter from J.M.C. Chavez

Fernando Duran y
Chavez

Jr. informed New Mexican historian
Ralph Twitchell of at least seven
generations of the Chavez family
descended from Don Fernando Duran y

Mariano
Chavez

Dolores
Perea

Henry
Connelly

Chavez, “Head of the Army of New
Mexico; Conquistador, and ReConquistados [sic],30 of New Mexico.”
His genealogy identified José Francisco
Chavez as the great-great-great grandson
of this early conquistador.31 Nicolás

José Francisco
Chavez

Condensed genealogical tree of José Francisco Chavez by
author.
Genealogy from Mariano Chavez Papers in Ralph E.
Twitchell Collection, New Mexico State Archives &
Records

30

This word was intended to be written “reconquistador”, or “reconqueror.” The reconquerers in New Mexican
history refer to the Spaniards who, under Diego de Vargas, retook the royal province of New Mexico from
American Indian control following the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. See Bannon, 79-91.
31

José Maria Chavez Jr. to Ralph E. Twitchell, letter, March 16, 1920, José Maria Chavez Papers, serial 8474, series
9, folder #151, Ralph Emerson Twitchell Collection, serial 8472, accession 1959-209 (Santa Fe: NMSA).
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Pino claimed similar ancestry.32 A lengthy genealogy sent to Twitchell in 1909 describes, “In
the Year 1693, there came to New Mexico, with the Reconquistador Diego de Vargas Zapata
Lujan, Captain Nicolás Ortiz Niño Ladrón de Guevarra.” According to the genealogy, Nicolas
Pino’s mother, Ana Maria Baca, was Ortiz Niño Ladrón de Guevarra’s great-great-great
granddaughter on her mother’s side.33 This centuries-old Spanish heritage provided the basis for
the wealth of prominent families. The first conquistadors received some of the most valuable
land grants, also called mercedes, from the Spanish crown for their service in conquering the faroff northern reaches of the empire. Socially, Spanishness justified the powerful position of
families like the Chavez and Pino clans.34 In both Hispanic New Mexican and, later, EuroAmerican discourse, this “civilized” European blood made ricos worthy of self-governance and
land ownership, distinguishing them from what Hispanic New Mexican memoirist Rafael
Chacón called the “savage nations” of North America as well as from the debt peons and
enslaved Indians who worked their land grants. 35
Given their independence from Spanish metropolitan power, comparatively little changed
in Nuevo Mexicano political and cultural life when Mexico declared its independence from
Spain in 1821. Economic shifts did begin in urban centers such as Santa Fe when the Mexican
government removed a Spanish embargo on international trade, permitting Anglo merchants to

32

Nicolás Pino’s parents identified in AASF, Santa Fe Baptisms, Reel 16, Frame 402, NMSA Reference Card:
“Nicolás de Jesús Pino, baptized Dec. 6, 1819, legitimate son of Pedro Pino and Ana María Baca. Padrinos: Juan
Rafael Ortiz and Gertrudis Pino.”
33

“Genealogy of the Pedro Baptista Pino,” Ralph Emerson Twitchell Collection, serial 8472, accession 1959-209,
Ortiz Family Papers, Folder #173 (Santa Fe: NMSA).
34

For Spanishness in opposition to Indianness, see Martha Menchaca, “Chicano Indianism: A Historical Account of
Racial Repression in the United States”, American Ethnologist 20.3 (August 1, 1993), 583-603. For Spanishness as
a political tactic in post-annexation New Mexico, see John M. Nieto Phillips, The Language of Blood: The Making
of Spanish-American Identity in New Mexico, 1880s-1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008).
35

Chacón ed. Meketa, 185.
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move new goods through northern Nuevo Mexicano towns on their route to Chihuahua along the
“Santa Fe Trail.” 36 It was in this growing mercantile network that Pino and Chavez became
employed in their late adolescence. In 1821, however, Nicolás Pino was an infant, born in Santa
Fe in 1819. He was the eldest son of the wealthy, politically influential Pino clan. 37 José
Francisco Chavez would not be born for another twelve years. For the next two decades of
Mexican rule, Nuevo México continued much as it had under Spain: education remained
severely limited, and herding sheep across vast Spanish land grants still proved the most
profitable occupation in a relatively poor area. Attacks on and by Indian groups, primarily the
Comanches and Apaches, continued to wrack the region with violence that perpetuated the
capture and exchange of both Indian and Nuevo Mexicano women and children as slaves. 38
José Francisco Chavez was born into this distinct world in 1833, in Bernalillo County’s
Los Padillas. After receiving his primary religious education in Chihuahua, the eight year-old
José Francisco departed New Mexico to study at St. Louis University in 1841, where he

36

For a general synopsis of the continuity of lifeways and culture, see Sánchez et. al, 74-82. On Mexican
maintenance of Spanish land grant policies, see Montoya, 47-48. On the continuation of Indian slave exchanges and
other unregulated borderlands markets, see Brooks, 234-247. On the growth of U.S. trade and Anglo influence after
1821, see Ramón A. Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in
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remained until 1846.39 It was during this departure for the east that Mariano Chavez reportedly
warned his son of the coming of the English-speaking heretics to their native land.
Less than six months later in Santa Fe, Nicolás Pino married Juana Rascón on February
16th, 1842.40 Pino was twenty-two years-old. Juana’s age is more difficult to pinpoint. U.S.
censuses indicate that Juana was born in “El Paso, Mexico” between 1820 and 1830, implying
that she was between twelve and twenty-two years-old at the time of her marriage. 41 “El Paso”
refers to what is now El Paso, Texas, but would have been Mexican territory at the time of
Juana’s birth. Her parents were also born in Mexico, in the northern state of Chihuahua. 42 It is
possible that the couple met while the young Nicolás traveled as a merchant along established
caravan routes to northern Mexico. Pino’s lifelong marriage to Juana Rascón contrasts with the
marriages of other elite Nuevo Mexicanos. The Rascón family, rooted in Mexican Texas and
northern Mexico, appears to have had little connection to the group of conquistador-descended
Nuevo Mexicanos that dominated Santa Fe. 43 Perhaps the couple married for love, though
without personal writings by either party, it is impossible to know. Whatever their motives, their
marriage complicates scholarly assumptions about the social isolation of Hispanic New Mexican
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elites by demonstrating that, even preceding annexation, men like Pino traveled widely. In this
travel, they married women outside their local circle of power, creating kinship ties that stretched
across provincial and national borders. Pino would call upon Juana’s ties to the northern
Mexican state of Chihuahua following the U.S.-Mexican War.
The 1850 federal census of the Pino family gives insight into the position of other elite
women in Hispanic New Mexican society. That year, nine people including Juana and Nicolás
lived in a large Santa Fe home. This property was owned not by Nicolás, the eldest son, but by
his widowed44 mother, Ana María Baca. The census lists her as “head of household” and notes
her real estate value at 20,000 U.S. dollars, or approximately $634,000 in 2016. 45 This real estate
was most likely one of the more than three hundred large parcels of land granted by the Spanish
crown between 1692-1821.46 The ownership of this considerable amount of property by Pedro
Pino’s widow, rather than his sons, supports Joseph Sánchez’s argument that “women of New
Mexico were more independent than their counterparts in the eastern states” due to their rights to
divorce and to own property under their own name. 47 Firsthand accounts of Nuevo Mexicano
women like Ana María prove even more scarce in the nineteenth century archive than those of
their male counterparts. Despite this, what may be reconstructed suggests that rica women like
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Ana María, the counterparts of their patrón husbands, also held significant local power based on
wealth and ancestry.
For both men and women of Hispanic New Mexico, the summer of 1846 brought
significant changes. The outbreak of the U.S.-Mexican War and the arrival of United States
troops in relatively isolated Nuevo Mexicano lands signaled the beginning of Hispanic New
Mexican elites’ encounters with U.S. colonial power. 48 In June of that year, General Stephen
Watts Kearny’s seventeen hundred U.S. troops arrived in the Southwest to enforce Congress’
paper claim on New Mexico.49 At the time, the thirteen-year-old José Francisco Chavez was
hundreds of miles from his family, pursuing an education in the U.S. 50 Nicolás Pino turned
twenty-seven that year. While his occupation as a merchant and rancher in Santa Fe did not
directly involve him with New Mexico’s territorial government, his family’s wealth and Spanish
heritage afforded him and his brothers the privileges and responsibilities of patrones. Positioned
as such, Nicolás Pino advised New Mexico’s governor at the time, Manuel Armijo, to resist the
incursion of General Kearny’s U.S. troops.51 Instead, Governor Armijo’s militias surrendered to
Kearny’s forces at the Battle of Santa Fe without firing a shot. With considerable American
military force behind him, Kearny entered Santa Fe and established a new civil government for
the subdued territory. The system left local politics in the hands of the Nuevo Mexicano
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patrones who had controlled regional affairs for decades, but gave them only three of the nine
territorial government posts.52
In response to the annexation, Nicolás Pino joined the “Junta Revolucionaria” or “Junta
de Conspiradores” to plan a revolt against the new Anglo-dominated territorial government in
December 1846. Though his motivations to revolt were not recorded, the annexation posed a
direct threat to the sovereignty of ricos like himself over their ancestral land grants and territorial
politics.53 It is likely that this danger motivated Pino and other patrones to check U.S. incursions
on their spheres of socioeconomic power. An early twentieth-century account (ca. 1900-1909)
of the “conspiration” named Nicolás Pino as one of “the most prominent” members of the Junta,
which met in Pino’s hometown of Santa Fe. 54 Before their revolt could be successfully executed,
however, two “traidores (traitors)” revealed the plot to U.S. officials. “When they found out that
the conspiration was given,” most of the Junta’s leadership “away fled from the city”, forcing the
Junta to postpone their revolutionary actions until the following year. Nicolás Pino and another
conspirator, unable to flee Santa Fe, were “arrested and taken with the American forces to aid
them therein the outbreak.”55 American marshals then compelled Pino to take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.56
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By January 1847, the Junta de Conspiradores regrouped and initiated violence in the city
of Taos, where a group of Nuevo Mexicanos and Pueblo Indians successfully assassinated newly
appointed U.S. governor Charles Bent. General Kearny’s successor enlisted Nicolás Pino’s aid
in subduing this “Taos Revolt.”57 Approximately two thousand New Mexican residents
confronted U.S. forces en route to Santa Fe at the end of January 1847 but were rapidly broken
up by cannon fire while U.S. forces destroyed nearby Nuevo Mexicano homes and ranches.
After two more unsuccessful uprisings that year, four hundred New Mexicans had died in the
conflict.58 The handwritten note included with a typed account of these events lists fourteen men
of the “Junta” who participated in the “Grito en Taos (Proclamation at Taos)”, among them
“M.E. [Miguel E.] Pino” and “Facundo Pino”. Though no writing by Nicolás has been found
regarding these events, one can imagine that his forced betrayal of the conspirators must have
been difficult; Miguel and Facundo were Nicolás’s only two living brothers. 59 Nicolás’s conflict
between political and personal loyalties, while painful, was certainly not unique to the Pino
family nor to the 1846-47 revolts. Kinship bonds, whether of blood, religion, or economic
patronage, served as the basis for socio-political status in New Mexico while simultaneously
creating conflicts and influencing how Nuevo Mexicanos in official positions executed their
duties. The intricate connections between the small number of the region’s rico families created
a political climate that was inherently personal from the earliest days of settlement.
All three of the Pino brothers lived through the violence of the U.S. Mexican War to
emerge as residents of a new U.S. territory. After a U.S. military tribunal hanged one of the
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leaders of the 1847 uprising, military authorities transferred the fifty remaining New Mexican
prisoners of war to the newly-formed territorial civil court system, where most were acquitted. 60
The younger Pinos, Facundo and Miguel, seem to have been among those exonerated. 61
Furthermore, census records imply that, despite their elder brother’s betrayal, Nicolás and his
younger brothers remained close. In 1850, Facundo and Nicolás lived in their mother’s home in
Santa Fe, with Miguel next door.62 In 1863, Nicolás named one of his sons “Facundo”,
presumably after the child’s uncle.63 Perhaps Facundo forgave Nicolás for his actions during the
revolt, understanding the tremulous political lines upon which Nuevo Mexicano patrones walked
during times of crisis as they tried to ensure their own survival while also contesting U.S.
incursion on their socio-economic power. The Pino brothers and other prominent Nuevo
Mexicanos had tried and failed to resist the colonial threat to this power through violence. In this
failure, the unity of their family proved more important to maintaining their wealth and influence
than Nicolás Pino’s coerced allegiance to the United States. The Junta de Conspiradores had
proved that armed resistance to the U.S. was not a practicable option. As such, rico families led
by patrones like Nicolás Pino and José Francisco Chavez changed their tactics following
annexation, opting to use both the U.S. legal system and interpersonal integration with newlyarrived Anglo-American elites as means to retain their status within Hispanic New Mexican
society.
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II. “May the old laws remain in force”, 1848-1860. 64
In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the U.S.-Mexican War and annexed
over a third of Mexico’s former land to the United States, including New Mexico. The treaty’s
position on Nuevo Mexicano citizenship and property rights looked favorable to Hispanic New
Mexican elites like Pino and Chavez. Non-Native residents 65 of the new territory would become
U.S. citizens by default unless they explicitly “declare[d] their intention” to remain Mexican
citizens within one year of the treaty’s ratification.66 The political implications of U.S.
citizenship were valuable to Nuevo Mexicano elites. It was citizenship that conferred the right to
vote in local elections and hold public office, allowing patrones to continue to dominate local
politics through electoral demographics (in 1850, ninety-two percent of the territory’s sedentary
population was Hispanic).67 As important for the patrón identity, the treaty also affirmed Nuevo
Mexicano land ownership rights, dictating that “Mexicans now established in territories…shall
be free to continue where they now reside…retaining the property which they possess in the said
territories.”68 This clause allowed landed elites like Pino and Chavez to maintain the vital
foundation of their economic power: inherited land grants. Even as their lands and electoral
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control remained in-tact, however, the political and cultural landscape around them began to
change. The end of the U.S.-Mexican War imposed new borders and citizenships upon a
Hispanic New Mexico that had been separated from imperial metropolitan politics since the
seventeenth century. The experiences of Nicolas Pino and J.F. Chavez during this transitional
period reveal certain complications of Nuevo Mexicanos’ liminal status between “citizen” and
“foreigner”. Their responses to this status suggest possible adaptations of Nuevo Mexicano
elites to new international borders and Anglo-American institutional power.
An 1852 civil lawsuit against Nicolás Pino makes clear that, for one elite family, the new
Mexican border became porous in the face of pre-existing regional kinship networks. The case
further demonstrates how Pino, like other monolingual Hispanic New Mexicans, relied on
familial resources to navigate language barriers. Spencer & Grandjean vs. Nicolas Pino was
filed in February of 1852 in Santa Fe.69 In 1852, the merchant firm of Charles Spencer and
Henry Grandjean—whose stationary identified them as “Wholesale Importers of Fancy and
Staple Goods, Watches, Jewelry and Music Boxes”70—filed suit against Pino for evasion of a
two hundred dollar debt incurred by the latter in August of 1851. The plaintiffs alleged that Pino
was now a resident of Chihuahua, Mexico71—the state where his wife Juana and her family
originated—yet claimed his property in Santa Fe as damages. Upon investigating the case, the
federal marshal of the territory found that Nicolás Pino and Juana had migrated across the
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Mexican border sometime after 1848, leaving the Santa Fe property in the hands of Nicolás’s
younger brothers, Miguel and Facundo Pino.72 It was they who received the marshal and later
served as agents of their elder brother by writing letters in English to the court. As such, Nicolás
depended on his close kin to serve as translators and advocates for him in the newly Anglicized
territorial courts. In the environment of New Mexico, which lacked a public education or robust
translation system, these social resources became critical not only for Nicolás Pino, but for the
thousands of Nuevo Mexicanos who did not speak the English necessary to navigate Anglo
bureaucracy. The search for unofficial translators continued through the nineteenth century. 73
Nicolás Pino’s reported migration from New Mexico to Mexico may be due to several
factors, including a desire to escape payment of his debt, an avoidance of other Santa Fe elites
whom he had betrayed in 1848, or travel for his occupation as a merchant. 74 Given his wife’s
familial connection to the Mexican state of Chihuahua, I posit that Nicolás and Juana moved to
Chihuahua, possibly to the home of Juana’s parents, semi-permanently after 1848. This
conclusion is supported by the place and date of the birth of one of Nicolás and Juana’s eldest
daughters, Margarita. According to the 1880 U.S. Census, Juana gave birth to a daughter in
Chihuahua, Mexico, rather than New Mexico, in 1850. 75
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The Pino family’s movement between the U.S. and Mexico suggests that the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo’s newly created national border had varying and occasionally nominal
impacts on the everyday geographies of elite Nuevo Mexicanos in the first years of its
existence.76 Despite what political maps dictated, trade and migration across the new frontier
continued largely unrestricted by any federal oversight in the decade following the treaty. Their
travel therefore reveals an important distinction between the macrohistory, which informs that
borders suddenly emerge at a specific political moment, and the microhistorical experience of
borderlands residents whose lives did not conform to the maps drawn up hundreds of miles
away. This was particularly the case for an elite family like the Pinos, whose mobility created a
kinship network that stretched beyond a single village and across international boundaries into
Chihuahua.
After the marshal’s investigation, more parties came before the court, including Nicolás
and his agent, Facundo Pino. They not only refuted the charges against Nicolás, but attempted to
use extant structures of the legal system to obtain a fair trial. This shows that the Pino brothers,
like many other Hispanic New Mexican elites, had familiarity with the civil law system of the
territory, even as it became more dominated by English-speaking outsiders. On March 24th,
Facundo argued for a change of venue on the grounds of bias in Santa Fe: “Facundo Pino ...saith
that he belives [sic] that Nicolas Pino...cannot have justice done him in the County of Santa
Fe…for the reason that the people of the County are preoccupied to such an affect in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendant that a jury cannot be obtained so that he can have a fair and
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impartial trial in the said county of Santa Fe.” 77 The two county clerks swore under oath that
Facundo’s complaint of bias was true.78
Neither Facundo nor the court clerks elaborated on why a jury in Santa Fe would have
been prejudiced against Nicolás and toward Spencer & Grandjean. A broad macrohistorical
view might explain the case through an ethno-racial dichotomy between Anglo-Americans and
Nuevo Mexicanos, attributing one position in favor of Nicolás Pino to all Hispanics and another
position against him to all Anglos. This conclusion, however, ignores the complexities of New
Mexican social and political relationships. Close investigation reveals two problems with this
reductive approach. First, juries in local courts continued to be drawn from both Hispanic and
Anglo citizens of the territory, and often did find in favor of Nuevo Mexicanos against Anglos. 79
Secondly, of the two court clerks who testified in favor of bias against Pino, one had a Spanish
name (Mauricio Durán) and one an English name (J.A. Mink). We must therefore examine
economic interest and other forms of social power that layered on top of ethno-racial identities.
Perhaps Charles Spencer’s clerkship with the Santa Fe county court and his mercantile wealth,
along with debts he may have held against other Santa Fe residents, placed him in a greater
position of social and economic power over both Anglo and Hispanic jurors. By contrast,
Nicolás Pino’s shifting allegiances during the U.S.-Mexican War may have isolated him from
elite New Mexican society, a conclusion supported by his sudden move to Chihuahua.
Unfortunately, the New Mexican State Archives case file contains no documents dated after this
request for a change of venue nor a transcript of a trial, if one occurred. I conclude that the case
77
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was dismissed or settled when, in March 1853, Spencer & Grandjean produced the notice of debt
given and signed by Nicolás Pino to the merchants in “Santa Fe, August 14th de 1851” to be paid
“on demand or order the sum of two hundred dollars.”
Eight years later, the 1860 census of Nicolás Pino’s household suggests that any
settlement that he did pay did not affect the traditional indicators of his patrón wealth. By 1860,
Pino had returned to the territory and settled down as an hacendado in the Santa Fe county town
of Galisteo. There, the U.S. census listed him as a “farmer” with a total estate value of $4000
U.S. dollars. As proof of his culturally specific patriarchal authority over Native women and
children, Nicolás Pino held five “servants” in his hacienda, at least two of whom were Indian
women.80 The younger, Vicenta, was an eighteen-year-old woman of the Mohave people. The
elder, Rosario, had been a servant in Nicolás’s mother’s home in 1850, moving to Nicolás’s new
hacienda by 1860. She was twenty-five years-old and identified as “Payuche”, most likely an
English-speaker’s corruption of the Spanish pronunciation of “Paiute.” 81 As Brooks has
identified, enslaved Indian women like those in Pino’s ranch “symbolized social wealth” and
“performed services for their masters”. 82 Both functions situated Nicolás Pino as a dominant
patrón within the centuries-old system of borderlands slavery.
While Pino firmly established his uniquely Nuevo Mexicano socio-economic status
during this period, the young J.F. Chavez was just beginning his journey as a Nuevo Mexicano
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patrón. He returned to New Mexico and took over the lucrative private involvements his father,
Mariano José, had established in mercantile freight, sheep herding, and mining across the
territory.83 Chavez traveled back from his education in the Northeastern U.S. in 1852 at the age
of nineteen in order to manage the estate and family businesses upon Mariano’s death. 84 His
mother, Dolores Perea de Chavez, soon remarried Dr. Henry Connelly, a bilingual AngloAmerican politician who would was appointed as the territory’s governor during the U.S. Civil
War.85 José Francisco Chavez also married during the 1848-1860 period. His place of marriage
and his choice of bride were far from typical for the eldest son of a dominant patrón, revealing
the mobility of the Nuevo Mexicano elite and the elasticity of elite society to absorb nonHispanic people without compromising its distinctive Spanish identity.
By 1854, the twenty-one-year-old Chavez held a central position in the maintenance of
the family’s businesses. The memoir of New Mexico’s territorial governor from 1853 to 1857,
David Meriwether, includes anecdotes about Chavez that demonstrate the extent to which the
young man travelled for these occupations.86 J.F. Chavez’s travel appears most strikingly in the
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story of his first marriage. In 1857, Chavez married Mary Bowie (Bowe) in San Francisco,
California at the age of twenty-four.87 Bowie was far from an ideal match for the first heir to one
of the most influential Hispanic New Mexican families. The 1860 Census, where she is listed as
“Mary Chavis”, indicates that she was born in Canada. Further investigation revealed a “Mary
Bowe” was born August 19th, 1832, in Prince Edward Island, Canada, and was baptized the
following year into the Church of England in the town of Richmond on the island. 88 As such, not
only was Mary an outsider to the Nuevo Mexicano rico community by place of birth and
ethnicity but by religion. In overwhelmingly and devoutly Catholic Hispanic New Mexican
society, her Anglicanism and her apparently middle- or lower-class birth would have raised
eyebrows if not an outright scandal. 89 Nevertheless, the newlyweds returned to Bernalillo
County by 1860. In that year’s federal census, “Mary Chavis” and José Francisco had two infant
daughters and a combined estate value of $55,000 USD.
The unconventional wedding of Mary and José Francisco provides valuable insight into
the mobility of the Hispanic New Mexican upper-class. José Francisco travelled as far as
California and Missouri in his youth. With his father’s death and this independence came
decisions that, perhaps, did not please his elite family. The story of their marriage, like that of
Nicolás and Juana’s a decade earlier, contradicts conventional macrohistorical narratives that
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portray the Nuevo Mexicano upper-class as entirely insular and confined to the borders of their
local communities. Chavez apparently worked to integrate Mary into this community by
bringing her back from California and settling down directly next to his mother’s home. 90 In this
way, Chavez began his lifelong negotiation between integration with Anglo-Americans and the
maintenance of a traditional Hispanic New Mexican elite status.
As an affirmation of this traditional patrón identity, Chavez, like Pino, held an Indian girl
as a “servant” in 1860 to mark his social wealth. Chavez likely abducted the thirteen-year-old
“Maria” himself during a raid on an Indian community or purchased her at a rescate (auction).91
His mother and stepfather’s home, located directly next door, had as many as four enslaved
Indian children “servants” in their home, indicating the couple’s extraordinary wealth and
prestige.92 The persistence of enslaved Indians in the rico households of Pino, Chavez, and their
family members affirms the ubiquity of the practice of borderlands slavery even after U.S.
annexation. The enslavement of women and children by both Native and Hispanic New
Mexican patriarchs was so inseparable from male social status in the region that it persisted in
elite haciendas through the turn-of-the-century.
The end of the 1850s marked the end of private life for J.F. Chavez and Nicolás Pino.
Pino had followed his wife’s kinship ties to migrate to Mexico along the nascent U.S.-Mexican
border, then negotiated legal trouble in the newly Anglicized civic government only to establish
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himself as a formidable patrón. Chavez had returned to his home, grown into adulthood along
the lucrative trans-Mississippi trails, and attempted to integrate an Anglican woman from Canada
into Bernalillo County’s elite Hispanic society. In 1859, the twenty-six-year-old José Francisco
Chavez was elected for the first time to the territorial legislature. He was unable to serve his full
term, however, as in 1861 he received and accepted a presidential military officer commission as
a major in the Union’s New Mexican campaign.93 Both men would act upon their traditional
military and social duties as patrones in the rapidly approaching Texan invasion of their
homeland. Even in times of crisis, they and the other Hispanic New Mexican elites who became
Union officers reinforced their distinctly Nuevo Mexicano socio-economic status through
culturally contingent beliefs in male honor and power.

III. “[New Mexico] desires to be left alone,” 1860-1862. 94
When the U.S. Civil War reached the New Mexico Territory, it did not, as some military
historians portray, encounter an indolent Hispanic New Mexican society that had no frame of
reference for warfare.95 On the contrary, the ways in which Pino, Chavez, and other Nuevo
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Mexicano elites reacted to the Civil War in their homeland relied upon the established role of
patrones during times of conflict with American Indian nations and, to a lesser extent, with
Texans. Moreover, the responses of ricos to the wartime influx of Anglo-American people and
power into their territory were grounded in strategies developed since 1848 to maintain a
culturally distinct socio-economic status in the fact of language barriers and Anglo prejudice.
Following Nicolás Pino and J.F. Chavez through the tumultuous Civil War years of reveals the
continuity in these strategies and responses that derived both from the duties of being a patrón
and the need to protect this very status.
On a macro scale, centuries of continual violence against powerful indigenous groups in
the Southwest, particularly Comanches, Apaches, Utes, and Navajos, proved one of the most
critical influences on how Hispanic New Mexican elites responded to the U.S. Civil War in New
Mexico. It was this history of violence that established the uniquely Nuevo Mexicano pattern of
frontier militia warfare deployed in the 1855-1856 Apache campaign, the 1860 Navajo
campaign, and during the U.S. Civil War. Chavez and Pino responded to the conflict following
their prescribed duties as community patriarchs within this frontier warfare tradition. This
tradition was still very much alive in the first half of 1860, on the eve of Abraham Lincoln’s
election. In August that year, a group of Hispanic New Mexican patrones, including Nicolás’s
brother Miguel, organized a Santa Fe convention with the purpose of discussing “appropriate,
effective, and efficient means to protect the lives of our citizens and the general interests of the
country, now attacked, as they long have been, by the Navajo Indians.” 96 Though a campaign
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against the Muache Ute and Jicarilla Apache had ceased barely four years earlier, the council
called on Hispanic New Mexico’s established system of militia raising under local patrón
leadership to wage another frontier war.
The declaration of the 1860 Santa Fe convention encapsulated the societal expectations of
prominent “hijos de Nuevo México (sons of New Mexico)”97 like Pino and Chavez during
warfare: they were to be motivated by the defense of their lands, the desire for revenge against
the Navajo, and the traditional masculine honor upon which their patrón status rested. These
expectations dictated that, for these reasons, local patriarchs should lead and/or supply their own
militia units, much as their forefathers had done in the absence of Spanish or Mexican military
aid. I argue that the actions of Nicolás Pino and J.F. Chavez during the U.S. Civil War show that
these historically and culturally specific motives of self-defense, male honor, and vengeance
influenced Nuevo Mexicano patrones to enlist far more than their feelings about the morality of
Black chattel slavery or the protection of a perpetual federal Union. 98
To the first point, despite their entrenched system of American Indian enslavement,
Hispanic New Mexican elites were largely divorced from investment in the political, social, and
economic system of Black chattel slavery that dominated the Southern U.S. 99 The 1860 U.S.
Census recorded just eighty-three “colored persons” in the territory among a total reported
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population of 93,516, some ninety percent of whom were Hispanic. 100 In 1859, three Anglo
Democrats and thirty-two Nuevo Mexicano sympathizers succeeded in passing a slave code in
New Mexico. The statute applied exclusively to people of African descent held in bondage
rather than to peons or indigenous slaves. 101 It had little practical effect, however, as there were
between twelve and sixty-four Black slaves recorded in the territory that year. 102 Moreover, both
Hispanic and Anglo New Mexican antebellum political writers repeatedly asserted that,
regardless of moral or economic imperatives, “As a consequence of its geographic and climatic
position, as well as other impediments presented by New Mexico, the practical introduction of
slaves within its borders is naturally almost impossible.” 103 James Brooks points out that the
existing system of American Indian bondage in the territory proved one of these impediments, as
both Anglo and Nuevo Mexicano elites already had a source of cheap labor they saw as separate
from the politics of chattel slavery. 104
As such, while the enslavement of American Indians had deep roots in Hispanic New
Mexico, its history, mechanisms, and purposes differed greatly from the chattel slavery of
Africans and African-descendants codified in the U.S. South. Brooks argues that, unlike
plantation slavery, Southwestern “borderland slavery found affinity with kin-based systems
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motivated less by a demand for units of labor than their desire for prestigious social units.” 105 As
discussed in chapters one and two, patrones like Pino and Chavez as well as their Indian
counterparts held a few members of the opposing group within their households to demonstrate
patriarchal power and gain domestic labor, not as a path to cash crop wealth. Anecdotal
evidence further suggests that, while most Nuevo Mexicano ricos like Pino and Chavez held
Indian slaves, they did not perceive their system of human trafficking as connected to
Euramerican plantation slavery.106 Though Nicolás Pino’s opinion on Black chattel slavery is
unrecorded, his brother Miguel came out against the 1859 New Mexican slave code, despite the
fact that both Miguel’s mother and his elder brother, Nicolás, held enslaved Indian women.
When Union official W.M. Need polled all three companies of Miguel E. Pino’s “Second
Regiment of New Mexico... (Captains Pino,107 Sena, and Baca y Delgado)” on their opinions of
the slave code in 1861, Need “did not find a solitary individual in favor of the slave code.” 108
This regiment, which presumably included Miguel himself, thus held a negative opinion of
codified Black chattel plantation slavery even as their family members engaged in the seizure
and enslavement of Indians. Miguel Pino’s response to the slave code reveals that he, like most
Nuevo Mexicanos, did not see Black slavery as connected to the New Mexican practices of
borderlands slavery in which his family participated.
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As illustrated in the story of the Pino brothers’ perceptions of Indian versus Black
slavery, Pino, Chavez, and almost all patrones did not derive social or economic wealth from the
labor of Black slaves, and therefore would have had little motivation to enlist in a Confederate
effort to protect it. The practice of Indian borderlands slavery that did uphold the socioeconomic power of the patrones had been largely ignored by abolitionists, and there was little
indication that the U.S. Civil War would change this neglect. The unwillingness of Southern
Democrats to regulate the practice in the 1859 slave code further confirmed that the system of
captivity and exchange between Indians and Nuevo Mexicanos in the borderlands remained out
of reach of any metropolitan power.
The Northern concept of democratic union also held little sway over Nuevo Mexicano
elites in 1860. As citizens of a U.S. territory, Hispanic New Mexicans could not participate in
presidential elections and their delegates in Congress had no vote. 109 Important local politics, per
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, remained firmly in the hands of patrones regardless of New
Mexico’s relationship to the federal government. Both factors isolated Nuevo Mexicanos from
the large-scale democratic process that many citizens of Northern states considered the greatest
form of government.110 Memoirist Rafael Chacón explicitly excluded the New Mexico territory
in his assessment of the Northern passion for federal union. According to him, the North
believed “the interests of the states could not be protected if disunited.”111 By using the word
“states”, which never referred to New Mexico in Hispanic antebellum discourse, Chacón implied
that the Union protected only its states, not its territories. Aware of the uncertain relationship of
109
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Nuevo Mexicanos to both chattel slavery and federal Union, both Union and Confederate
sympathizers attempted to influence the territory’s attitudes toward the war. 112 However, what
did motivate Pino, Chavez, and dozens of other Hispanic New Mexican patrones to military
action were their traditional patriarchal duties in the fact of an imminent threat on their lives and
property: the Texan invasion of 1861-62.
On February 28, 1861, the voters of Texas overwhelmingly ratified secession from the
Union, declaring Texas part of the Confederate States of America a few days later. Texas per se,
regardless of its status an independent republic, a U.S. or a Confederate state, had long cherished
what historian Donald Frazier calls “the vision of a vast Texan empire.” 113 This empire would
include the lands, trade routes, and mineral resources of New Mexico. 114 Texan imperial
aspirations perfectly aligned with Confederate goals to create an empire of slavery that would
reach from the Atlantic to the Pacific; Texas could provide the mounted manpower to make this
dream a reality while the Confederacy engaged U.S. forces east of the Mississippi. The first
steps toward realizing this dream were to claim New Mexico’s southern region, Arizona, as a
Confederate territory and bring New Mexico into the secessionist fold in order to create a
corridor to the Pacific coast of California.115
The long history of enmity between Texas and New Mexico stoked the revenge motive of
the patrones. Conflict over their border pre-dated both Texan independence and its annexation
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by the United States. After becoming an independent “Lone Star Republic” in 1836, Texas
conducted three state-sanctioned raids into the territory between 1841 and 1843. Small bands of
mounted rangers murdered several Nuevo Mexicano civilians and at least twenty-three militia
members, looting or burning stores and homes as they went until federal U.S. troops forcibly
disbanded them. The acts of terror did little but increase the fear and hatred many Hispanic New
Mexicans felt for their eastern neighbor. 116 This violent history was particularly impactful to J.F.
Chavez. During the 1843 raid, a member of J.F. Chavez’s extended family, “Antonio José”, was
murdered by Texans while accompanying a trade caravan on the Santa Fe trail. 117 The murder of
J.F. Chavez’s kin suggests that other Hispanic New Mexican elites involved in the Santa Fe trade
would have had similarly intimate experiences with Texan violence. These microlevel tragedies
underlay the macroscale conflict that many historians have identified between Texas and New
Mexico. It was for these specific, personal reasons that, while U.S. federal officials feared the
Confederacy as an instrument of the Southern slave power and a threat to the national Union,
Nuevo Mexicanos like Chavez considered Texans a threat to their immediate survival.118
These despised Texans gathered strength along Texas’ western border following the
Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter on April 12-14, 1861. U.S. General Winfield Scott,
however, ordered thousands of regular U.S. infantry units eastward out of New Mexico that
spring and summer. Movements to raise volunteer and militia troops within the territory itself
proceeded slowly.
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For reasons of politics, education, and race, J.F. Chavez received one of the earliest
officer commissions in the territory on July 1 as a Lieutenant Colonel in Christopher “Kit”
Carson’s First Regiment of New Mexico Volunteers.119 Chavez stood out as an easy choice for
Anglo-American authorities for several reasons. From a pragmatic standpoint, he spoke fluent,
university-educated English as well as Spanish, enabling him to translate for monolingual
English-speaking officers or Spanish-speaking recruits.120 His social status as a patrón who held
influence over men of the lower classes was also valuable to a war department desperate for
Nuevo Mexicano enlistment. Union officials hoped that appointments of “influential
Mexican[s]” such as Chavez would “stimulate the population...and send...volunteers to fill up the
companies.”121 J.F. Chavez’s familial connection to Governor Henry Connelly and his pale,
blue-eyed appearance contributed to the Anglo-American perception of Chavez as acceptably
white, or as close to white as a Mexican national could be in the mid-nineteenth century U.S.
racial imagination.122 As border studies scholar Anthony Mora writes, “Euro-Americans
assumed [New Mexicans’] status as Mexicans had racial connotations as ‘not white’”. American
studies scholar Laura Gómez termed this space between legally white and socially non-white as
“off-white.”123 Despite this status, wealthy Nuevo Mexicano elites, who had long insisted upon
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a distinctive Spanish heritage, more closely approximated U.S. social whiteness. This in turn
favored their appointment as officers over those who did not claim “pure” European ancestry.
Mere weeks after J.F. Chavez received his commission and just two days after the First
Battle of Bull Run, the Confederate invasion of New Mexico began in earnest on July 23, 1861.
That day, between 250 and 300 men of the Second Texas Regiment, Mounted Rifles crossed the
territory’s Southern boundary at El Paso with plans to move northward toward Albuquerque and
Santa Fe. The southern desert region into which they crossed, known as Arizona, was purchased
from Mexico by the U.S. and tacked on to the New Mexico territory in the 1853 Gadsden
Purchase. The first federal military installation the Texans encountered, Fort Stanton,
surrendered without firing a shot. A few days later, Texan Lieutenant Colonel Baylor
proclaimed all of Arizona to be a Confederate territory and established himself as military
governor.124 The Union commander of the military department of New Mexico, Lieutenant
Colonel Edward Canby, responded with a call for four more companies of volunteers to be
enlisted from the New Mexico territory. The recently-appointed Territorial Governor Connelly
(J.F. Chavez’s stepfather) complied, putting forth a September 8th proclamation that not only
encouraged enlistment in the volunteers but the formation of the same kind of local militia units
that had fought Native peoples in the territory for decades. 125 One day after this public call for
troops, Governor Connelly gave Nicolás Pino, another wealthy and light-skinned patrón, an
officer commission as Brigadier General of the 1st Brigade, Second Division of the Militia of the
Territory of New Mexico.126
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The unusual circumstances of Pino’s commission suggest the disorganization that arose
from Union attempts to administer a heretofore decentralized, local Nuevo Mexicano militia
tradition. Unlike volunteers who enlisted as individuals, militias often organized locally under
the auspices of a single patrón in a specific town, then presented themselves in this pre-existing
group to the service of the territory.127 As seen in the 1860 Navajo campaign, this method of
militia warfare was central to the status of Nuevo Mexicano elites. It was through this system
that patrones maintained power by proving that they could motivate those in their local spheres
of influence to defend the community. For centuries, these practices were effective at the local
level; they had maintained Nuevo Mexicano control of key communities like Santa Fe for the
last two centuries of borderlands warfare and metropolitan neglect. Union officials, however,
struggled to organize these informal, independent local militias alongside traditional volunteer
infantry. Some concluded that the perceived inferiority of Nuevo Mexicano militia traditions
arose from “the pusillanimity of the Mexicans.”128 One solution was to place these various
militias in a larger “brigade” under one commanding officer like Brigadier General Pino and
hope for the best. For this reason, Pino did not command the four regiments that officially
constituted a brigade in volunteer or regular U.S. army units. 129 Instead, Pino led a shifting
conglomeration of independent militia companies which the territorial government had loosely
placed under his jurisdiction out of a need to organize the disparate groups into some semblance
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of order. Several of these companies were mustered into service in the winter of 1862, mere
weeks or days before the Southwest’s first major battle at Valverde. 130
As the formidable Texan force advanced northwards towards Santa Fe in the fall of 1861,
the organization of enlisted Nuevo Mexicanos proved less important than the urgent need for
boots on the ground. In the absence of sufficient amounts of professional, well-supplied U.S.
army troops—the “Regulars”—men had to be raised by any means necessary. On October 27,
1861, Governor Connelly ordered 1,200 more militiamen, rather than official volunteer
companies, to be organized and equipped. 131 Newly commissioned patrón officers responded by
relying on their traditional methods of raising troops. One such officer, J.F. Chavez’s cousin
Francisco Perea, informed a Union inspector general that, in order to form his battalion, he
employed “this same system under which [soldiers] were raised during the administration of the
Mexican government, that is to say they were raised by force and through the alcaldes (mayors)
and constables.”132 Perea’s description of conscripting men by force implies a general resistance
to enlistment. Many scholars have reconsidered reluctance to enlist in light of the precarious
circumstances of poor Nuevo Mexicanos.133 Yet, even with resistance to conscription, Hispanic
New Mexicans of all classes did serve, and they did so in significant numbers. By the end of
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1861, Governor Connelly estimated that there were 4000 New Mexican militia and volunteers
along with 1,500 regular U.S. troops, most of whom were Anglo-Americans, in the territory. 134
Once their troops had been organized, Pino, Chavez, and other elite Nuevo Mexicano
officers confronted pervasive and sometimes violent Anglo-American prejudice against them and
their enlisted men. In responding to these prejudices, patrones again relied on their culturally
specific position to defend a distinctly Nuevo Mexicano masculine honor. Most AngloAmericans perceived “the Mexicans” as inherently inferior soldiers, and resistance to
conscription confirmed these pre-existing assumptions.135 Colonel E.R. Canby wrote in August
that year, “I have not much faith in the disposition of the Mexican to second us in this matter but
will do whatever I can to rouse them and put the Territory in the best possible position for
defense…”136 In one of the more vicious accounts of the campaign, Irish quartermaster Charles
Porter went so far as to say, “In general both then and afterwards by the white soldiers...these
NM allies were never considered reliable for a good fight, able perhaps to cope with
Indians…”137 While this racism and mistreatment has been well documented on the macroscale,
the small scale resistance of elite Hispanic New Mexican officers to such abuse has been less
studied. Though no records of Nicolás Pino’s actions as an officer before 1862 were found, the
ways in which Lt. Col. J.F. Chavez responded to Anglo-American insults during the training and
recruitment period suggest that patrón officers used bureaucratic channels of complaint and
resource to advocate not only for themselves, but for their enlisted men.
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In fall of 1861, Chavez’s First Infantry regiment was moved to Fort Union, where the
lieutenant colonel noticed a discrepancy between the quarters of the regular U.S. troops and
those of the volunteer men and officers. Chavez employed his literacy in English and familiarity
with military policies to file an official complaint with Union authorities. Per the "Plan of
Organization of the Volunteer Regiments", Chavez argued that all volunteer officers "were to
have the same rights as those of the Regular Army." 138 In his later military pension application,
Chavez further condemned the unequal practice of housing Nuevo Mexicanos in the “low watery
bottom” of the forts, arguing that this made them more vulnerable to disease. 139 Notably, while
Chavez’s letter sought to remedy the tangible effects of Anglo discrimination, he also explicitly
rejected the derogatory racial epithet “greaser” used by Anglo-American to insult Hispanic New
Mexicans. Chavez proudly claimed his own identity as a “Mexican”, but refused to have this
identity re-labeled by an outsider in the offensive term “greaser.” 140 Both the Anglo-American
Major Chapman and quartermaster John Courts McFerran responded to Lt. Col. Chavez’s
accusations with disdain, though neither denied the unequal treatment. Chavez was not
reprimanded or demoted, perhaps due to his status as the governor’s stepson. He also saw no
improvement in housing nor, in fact, in the troops’ delayed pay, lack of uniforms, and or the
antiquated weapons with which they were supplied. 141
One of the most visible and impactful ways in which patrones whose wealth had enabled
them to obtain an English education affirmed their value was in translation. As Nicolás Pino had
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discovered during his encounter with the English-speaking court system in 1852, English had
become the language of Anglo-dominated institutions, including the military, following U.S.
annexation. Colonel Canby worked to assign Spanish-speaking officers to Hispanic New
Mexican companies, ordering in October 1861, “all details will be made so that those speaking
the same language may serve together and privates as far as practicable, may serve under noncommissioned officers speaking their own language.” 142 When this was not practicable,
translation was desperately needed in taking testimony during military court martials; these were
moments when Lt. Col. Chavez and other educated patrones demonstrated unique linguistic
power. An English-speaking Union officer recorded one multi-paragraph testimony as
“Statement of Prisoners (as interpreted by Lieut. Colonel Chaves) confined at Fort Union, N.M.
for trading with the different Indian tribes of New Mexico” and certified that it was “A Correct
Translation.”143 Chavez and other bilingual officers likely did far more of this impromptu
translating in their day-to-day activities than the archive records; they were an invaluable
resource in a territory with no reliable public education or translation infrastructure.
As recurring issues of conscription, organization of troops, inadequate supplies, delayed
payment, and language barriers plagued the Union, the Texans under General Sibley advanced
northwards toward Santa Fe and Albuquerque. In February and March of 1862, the two defining
battles of the invasion of New Mexico took place: the Battle of Valverde (February 21) and the
Battle of Glorieta, also known as Pigeon’s Ranch (March 26, 28 1862). Of all the aspects of the
Civil War west of the Mississippi, these two battles have produced perhaps the most study. 144
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However, authors often assess the actions of Nuevo Mexicano troops only through AngloAmerican sources, particularly the writings of Union Colonel Canby, who actively sought out
Nuevo Mexicano units as a convenient scapegoat for Union losses in both engagements. 145 As
such, I do not discuss military tactics, but instead examine the microlevel discourse around the
Battle of Valverde as a proxy for macrolevel Anglo assumptions about Hispanic New Mexico.
During and after this pivotal battle, both Chavez and Pino acted upon patrón values of honor and
territorial defense to challenge Anglo-American assumptions of their inferiority.
The Battle of Valverde lasted from sunrise to sunset on February 21, 1862, and resulted
in a bloody last-minute victory for the Confederacy. 146 That day, two to three thousand
Confederate Texan troops approached U.S. Fort Craig from the south, heading northward with
the intention of capturing Santa Fe. Thirty-five to thirty-eight hundred Union men stationed in or
near Fort Craig—including regular U.S. troops, five New Mexican Volunteer regiments, a
company of Colorado volunteers, and approximately one thousand New Mexico militiamen—
stood in their path.147 Among the New Mexican forces were Lt. Col. J.F. Chavez’s First
Regiment New Mexico Volunteers and Nicolás Pino’s Second Regiment New Mexican Militia.
That morning, Colonel Canby stationed J.F. Chavez’s First Regiment of eight volunteer
companies, along with the Second Regiment New Mexico Volunteers (commanded by Nicolás
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Pino’s younger brother, Miguel),148 on the western side of the Rio Grande as Texan troops
advanced along the east bank of the river. 149 Both the First and Second Volunteers consisted
almost entirely of Hispanic New Mexicans. The position of these two volunteer regiments along
the river resulted in the most highly contested moment of the invasion. After a morning of
Union successes, the battle began to turn in favor of the Confederates. Seeing this, Colonel
Canby reportedly ordered the First and Second Volunteer regiments across the Rio Grande to the
east side of the river to reinforce the U.S. regular troops. According to Canby, J.F. Chavez’s
First Regiment obeyed and forded the stream toward the fighting. Canby reported that five
companies of the Second Regiment of Volunteers, however, refused to cross the water, while
others “gave way...in panic” to desert the battlefield entirely. 150 Canby and other resentful
officers insisted that “the cowardice and worthlessness of the N.M. troops” lead to the Union’s
loss of an artillery battery and, ultimately, the loss of the Battle of Valverde. 151 Many laid the
two hundred to three hundred Union casualties at their feet. 152
J.F. Chavez publicly challenged Col. Canby’s version of events thirty years later. On
June 17, 1890, Chavez entered the debate on Valverde through a letter to the editor of The New
Mexican. At that time, he was no longer a young military leader but a formidable politician. 153
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As he had during his time in the sub-standard quarters at Fort Union, Chavez defended the honor
of his Nuevo Mexicano community using his elevated socio-economic position. This defense
complied with the expectation that a patrón would serve as an advocate for the less-powerful
within his sphere of influence during times of crisis. Chavez’s own reputation, in fact, suffered
little injury at Valverde: Canby specifically named him, along with “many other officers of the
New Mexican Volunteers...for their zeal and energy.” 154 Despite this personal security, Chavez
published an acerbic rebuke to Canby and other Anglo-American officers. He wrote, “There was
no confusion among the New Mexico Volunteers to amount to anything.” Far from refusing to
cross the Rio Grande, “nearly all the troops...were on the east side at Valverde and had already
had several severe conflicts with the Confederate troops in which our troops had come off
victorious.” Chavez argued that these Nuevo Mexicano troops fought valiantly, and retreated
west to Fort Craig “without breaking ranks” only upon Canby’s orders, not due to cowardice or
panic.155 In this way, Chavez rejected any insult to communal Hispanic New Mexican masculine
military honor, even when his personal honor was not at stake. Political concerns may have also
motivated the territorial politician to rebut Canby’s claims. At the time of this article’s
publishing, Chavez was dedicated to the campaign for New Mexican statehood. By portraying
Hispanic New Mexicans as active, valuable participants in the war to save the Union, Chavez
implied that these same men deserved a more equal share within it.
Unlike J.F. Chavez, Nicolás Pino did not fight on the main battlefield of Valverde nor did
he enter into the contentious debates about the supposed-cowardice of Nuevo Mexicano troops.
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Rather, Pino and his militia units became the subjects of an argument about two other matters:
the desertion of Hispanic New Mexican enlistees and the relative value of such soldiers in
prisoner-of-war exchanges. The story of their capture as told through Union and Confederate
correspondence reveals that the Anglo perception of Nuevo Mexicanos as lesser soldiers did
more than wound their pride. It determined how the U.S. government treated—or ignored—
captured New Mexicans after the battle had ended. During the Battle of Valverde, Nicolás
Pino—now referred to as a “colonel” rather than a brigadier general 156—led a small group of
“200 mounted militiamen” alongside other hundred-men militia units to skirmish with Texan
soldiers south of the main battlefield. Major Charles E. Wesche of this second militia regiment
reported that this was in accordance with orders “to cut off some wagons of the rebels” and
“demolish” the enemy camp by nightfall. After accomplishing this destruction with explosives,
Pino’s group of militia units returned to the Union stronghold at Fort Craig by 10:30 pm. 157
Three days later, on February 24th, Union General Hovey ordered Col. Pino’s Second
Regiment New Mexican militia northward to the civilian town of Socorro. There they were to
defend the town against capture and cut off the victorious Texans’ movement north. No sooner
had the regiment released their horses than a Texan picket fired at the town; a Union advanced
guard reported to Colonel Pino that the Texans had encamped a few miles southwest of Socorro.
The situation escalated until, according to Major Wesche, “about 8 p.m. the enemy fired a
cannon-ball over the town, and from that moment our men began to desert and to hide
themselves away.” Unable to immediately mount a defense due to desertion, Col. Pino agreed to
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treat with—but not surrender to—the Confederate superior officer, Colonel McNeill, hoping to
stall until Union reinforcements arrived. 158 The U.S. forces, however, were still licking their
wounds from Valverde, and had experienced similar rates of desertion. When McNeill invited
Colonel Pino to observe the Texan camp later than night, the Union officer concluded the battle
could not be won and surrendered at 2 am on February 25, 1862. 159 At 10 am, approximately
150 militiamen came “out of their hiding places” to take the oath of neutrality. The Confederacy
took over two hundred officers and enlisted men as prisoners of war. Of these, Colonel Nicolás
Pino, Major Wesche, and a lieutenant colonel were paroled, a term used during the Civil War to
designate a prisoner allowed to return to their home with the promise not to take up arms again
until formally exchanged by their commander. 160
Once the two hundred soldiers who had stayed in Socorro were captured along with their
superior officer, Colonel Nicolás Pino, they faced an uncertain fate due to their Nuevo Mexicano
identity. Confederate General Sibley intended to exchange these men for the Confederate
prisoners taken by the Union. However, his correspondence with Union officers revealed that
Anglo-American officers did not believe these Hispanic New Mexican militiamen to be of equal
value to the captured Texan soldiers. In May 1862, with his Texans in active retreat, General
Sibley wrote to Col. Canby, “[Union] Col. Paul... declined to exchange for these prisoners,
though I am at a loss to conceive upon what principle. It matters not whether they were militia,
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Volunteers or Regulars. I presume it cannot be denied that they constituted a portion of your
forces...and were in every sense in the service of the United States.” 161 Colonel Canby
responded that, while “those who were properly included in the capitulation at Socorro...would
have been exchanged upon equal terms,” there were also deserters from the New Mexican militia
who did not merit exchange. Canby concluded that these deserters “skulked from the impending
conflict...and after the danger…gave themselves up to your troops...to secure their personal
safety...”162 The inclusion of these men made the prisoner transfer void in Canby’s eyes, since
he would not return valuable Texan combatants to the service of the Confederacy in exchange
for untrustworthy Nuevo Mexicano militiamen. Nicolás Pino was paroled to return to his home,
but formally remained a prisoner of war for three years until discharged at the war’s end in 1865,
suggesting that he and likely his enlisted men were never exchanged. 163 Canby’s decision to
abandon all the Socorro prisoners, regardless of desertion status, thus reveals the immediate
consequences of macroscale Anglo-American discrimination against Hispanic New Mexicans.
Though New Mexican parolees could return to their homes rather than a P.O.W. camp, they
remained in a state of limbo between Union soldier and civilian. If exchanged, they could be
pressed back into Union service; left as parolees, they were unable to take up arms to defend
themselves against Confederate forces, many of whom raided homes and farms during their
retreat through the territory.
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While Nicolás Pino’s military career ended with his surrender at Socorro on February 25,
1862, J.F. Chavez and hundreds of other Nuevo Mexicanos, including Pino’s brother Miguel,
continued to repel the Texan invasion. On March 7th, the Texans took the city of Albuquerque
with no resistance, raiding many Nuevo Mexicano villages between Valverde and Albuquerque
for food and firewood, causing famines and homelessness.164 On March 26 and 28, Union
reinforcements from Fort Union and Colorado beat back the Texan advance toward Santa Fe in
the two battles fought in Glorieta Pass. The real victory of Glorieta, however, had not been
achieved on the main battlefield. Instead, the destruction of the Texan supply wagons, guided by
a Hispanic New Mexican lieutenant colonel and a Nuevo Mexicano Catholic priest, forced the
Texans to retreat or starve.165
J.F. Chavez’s whereabouts during this time are somewhat murky. His First New Mexico
Volunteers are not officially recorded as fighting at Glorieta in March. 166 On April 1 General
Canby ordered ten regiments under J.F. Chavez’s colonel, Christopher “Kit” Carson, to guard
Fort Craig. It is likely Chavez remained at Fort Craig with Carson’s garrison, and may have
been quartered there since Valverde.167 Following Glorieta, the Texan Confederates retreated to
Santa Fe, but soon evacuated both that city and Albuquerque due to lack of supplies and the
pressure of approaching Union forces from Colorado and California. One final battle occurred at
Peralta on April 14th, in which Union forces further demoralized the now-starving, exhausted
Texans, pushing them into full retreat across the sixty mile stretch of waterless desert known as
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la Jornada del Muerto (the aptly named “dead man’s journey”). 168 After eventually straggling
back into Arizona, General Sibley abandoned the new Confederate territory with a mere skeleton
crew. This small, demoralized garrison was soon overwhelmed by Apache guerrillas, Hispanic
Arizonan resistance, and the eventual arrival of the California column. 169

IV. “Fighting with the ancient enemy,” 1862-1865. 170
By the summer of 1862, the Texans had left for good. J.F. Chavez, Nicolás Pino, and
thousands of other Hispanic New Mexicans, however, remained in their homeland, as did a
significant number of Anglo U.S. troops. Following the retreat, the U.S. Army in the Southwest
turned its focus toward a brutal frontier war against the Navajo and Apache nations. This war,
too, required the participation of Hispanic New Mexican patrones like Lt. Col. J.F. Chavez, who
had been raised to lead militias against Indians from birth. J.F. Chavez’s post-invasion military
career provides a microlevel vantage point from which to analyze broader Nuevo Mexicano elite
responses to U.S. federal Indian policy. His story shows that patrones participated in
government-sponsored violence against Native people while they and their troops simultaneously
undermined federal policies in favor of traditional Nuevo Mexicano methods of borderlands
warfare.
Immediately following the Texan retreat in May 1862, Lt. Col. José Francisco Chavez
was transferred to the newly organized First New Mexico Cavalry at Fort Wingate. Chavez’s
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prior colonel and famous “mountain man”, Kit Carson, led the regiment. 171 His cavalry unit was
one of the 1,062 remaining New Mexico Volunteers assigned to the "Indian campaign" by fall of
1862, alongside 1500 more militiamen ordered into service in September that year and October
of 1863. The U.S. War Department’s purpose in these brutal military endeavors went beyond
chastising American Indian raids on a case-by-case basis. Rather, the United States—with
significant Hispanic New Mexican support—initiated a campaign of forced starvation and
military capture to compel the Diné people to relocate to the first federal reservation in the U.S.
Southwest territories: Bosque Redondo, also known as Fort Sumner. 172 During that period, eight
thousand Navajo would reach Bosque Redondo, and uncounted hundreds died of exposure,
starvation, or attacks along the way.173 The small number of Apaches who survived Colonel Kit
Carson’s brutal 1862 campaign were also relocated at gunpoint to the new Bosque Redondo
reservation.174
To this end, Lt. Col. J.F. Chavez of the newly-created First New Mexico Cavalry was
assigned to oversee the construction of a new federal installation, Fort Wingate, in October
1862.175 The fort’s location west of the Rio Grande near the present-day Arizona-New Mexico
border stood intentionally close to ancestral Navajo lands. 176 Wingate, occupied by over twohundred people by June 1863, was to be the point of departure for thousands of Diné on the
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forced march southwards to Bosque Redondo.177 Most of the violence that took place out of
Chavez’s Fort Wingate occurred in the Hispanic New Mexican militia style of Indian warfare.
Groups of forty to one hundred New Mexico or California cavalry volunteers rode out from the
fort on short-term expeditions of a few dozen days with the goal of killing or capturing any
Navajo they determined to be hostile. Reported Navajo attacks on supply trains or livestock
often served as justification for these individual raids. One prototypical report from July 31,
1863 summarizes this pattern: “Lieutenant-Colonel Chavez reports that Capt. Rafael
Chacon...with 22 men, was sent in pursuit of a band of Indians who had stolen some horses and
oxen from Fort Wingate...The troops followed the trail of the Indians for three days, and finally
overtook them, when a sharp fight ensued. The Indians fought with great bravery, but were
finally driven from their cover, and fled...Indian loss unknown, troops, 1 private wounded.” 178
The dozens of 1863 and 1864 reports similar to this one follow the style and motivations of the
established Nuevo Mexicano militia tradition identified in chapter three.
The most substantial way in which Chavez employed traditional tactics of Southwestern
warfare was in his participation in the capture and exchange of American Indian and Hispanic
New Mexican children. As James Brooks has shown, war between Nuevo Mexicanos and Native
peoples had long served as a justification to take women and children from the enemy as slaves
or adoptees in order to demonstrate the captor’s masculine dominance. 179 The practice continued
at Chavez’s Fort Wingate, despite the U.S. prohibition on all forms of non-penal slavery
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following the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation. In one of many examples, Captain Chacón
reported on August 23, 1863 that his forty man scouting party “attacked 150 Indians” and
“captured 7 children and recovered a captive Mexican boy named Agapito Apodaca.” 180 As the
commanding officer and, more importantly, as a patrón whose status was affirmed in this human
exchange, J.F. Chavez took responsibility for returning Hispanic children like Agapito to their
families. Simultaneously, Chavez permitted his men to kidnap Native children. 181 This was
perhaps not surprising when one recalls that Chavez himself held one enslaved thirteen-year-old
Indian girl in 1860.182 Hispanic New Mexican enslavement of Navajo children during this
period was necessarily detrimental to the federal government’s desire to remove the Diné people,
including Diné children, to the reservation. The conflict between Nuevo Mexicano practices and
U.S. law eventually prompted General Carleton to order that all Navajo captives, regardless of
age, had to be sent to Bosque Redondo.183
Despite J.F. Chavez’s participation in the Navajo campaign, he came out against the
reservation project during his subsequent 1865 campaign for territorial delegate. By that time,
many Nuevo Mexicanos’ opinions on Bosque Redondo worsened as the financial and human
cost of the reservation came to light. In particular, the cessation of captive commerce disrupted
local economic practices and labor needs in the territory. 184 As adaptive as ever, J.F. Chavez
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downplayed his role in the campaign to maintain popular support among the Hispanic New
Mexican community, rejecting Bosque Redondo as a failure. 185 In 1868, the continual advocacy
by Diné leaders, particularly Barboncito, convinced generals in Washington as well as Hispanic
New Mexicans like Chavez of the failures of the Bosque Redondo reservation. On June 1, 1868,
ten Navajo delegates signed a treaty that granted to them their ancestral lands, Diné Bikéyah, as a
new reservation to which they could immediately return. 186
In addition to expanding its Indian policies, the U.S. federal government also increased
its presence in the daily lives of Nuevo Mexicano civilians after 1862. A claim for federal
compensation made by Nicolás Pino during this period serves as one example of this large-scale
shift in the territory’s increasing participation in U.S. federal institutions, even among previously
independent patrones.187 In 1863 Nicolás Pino, then a paroled prisoner of the Confederacy,
sought the aid of the U.S. provost marshal to reclaim his horse from the U.S. military. On
December 7 of that year, the marshal J.L. McFerran reported, “Nicholas [sic] Pino, Informs that
one of his horses, which he describes, was stolen from him and is now in the possession of the
War Dpt. at Fort Union.” One week later, an officer at Fort Union replied, “Respectfully report
that the within described horse is at this Dept. and was purchased by José [illegible] for $150.”188
The provost marshal does not indicate whether Pino reclaimed his horse after receiving this
information. The way in which Pino sought his property proves more revealing than the result.
In the 1852 civil lawsuit discussed in Chapter II, Nicolás relied upon the private support system
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of his brothers, Facundo and Miguel. These family members, rather than any federal official,
advocated for Nicolás. It was Facundo who spoke with a U.S. marshal who came to investigate
Pino’s home, and who appeared before the court. A decade later, Nicolás sought assistance
through the official federal channel of the Anglo provost marshal. Such a change implies Pino’s
adaptation to new forms of power and legal jurisdiction in the territory. He, like many other
Hispanic New Mexican veterans, had encountered these bureaucratic systems during his military
service, and he continued to employ them to his own ends afterwards. The efforts of these men
to seek restitution through the federal government after the war show that Hispanic New
Mexicans fit within one well-established macro theory of Civil War history: people at the
margins of the society increasingly used the federal government during and after the war to
survive and claim space in a nation that excluded them. 189
The U.S. Civil War officially concluded with Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s
surrender at Appomattox on April 9th, 1865. A few months before the war’s end, José Francisco
Chavez was honorably discharged from the First New Mexico Cavalry on November 22,
1864.190 The well-connected thirty-two-year-old capitalized on his wealth, education, and the
masculine honor acquired through his long military service by running for territorial delegate.
On September 4, 1865 Chavez was successfully elected as New Mexico’s territorial delegate to
the U.S. House of Representatives, defeating his first cousin Francisco Perea, who had served in
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the position since 1863.191 The war’s end also marked the conclusion of Nicolás Pino’s parole as
a prisoner of war and a quiet return to public office.
The New Mexico territory, and the lives of Nicolás Pino and J.F. Chavez, looked
significantly different at war’s end. After the Texan retreat from Arizona, Congress split the
former New Mexico territory in two along the 109th meridian, creating the new federal territory
of Arizona along the state’s present-day borders. 192 A majority of one of the most powerful
Indian peoples in the Southwest had been brutally displaced to an inhospitable reservation. On
paper, all forms of slavery, including the American Indian-Nuevo Mexicano system of
intercultural capture and enslavement, had been abolished, even as variations of the practice
along with its resultant kinship ties remained. 193 Perhaps most immediate to Nuevo Mexicano
post-war society was the increase in Anglo-American settlement and influence augmented by the
construction of railroads. The young, bilingual politician J.F. Chavez would find great success in
this rapidly changing landscape. Nicolás Pino, a middle-aged member of the pre-annexation
elite, would pursue a more traditional pre-war life as a rancher in Galisteo, Santa Fe, interacting
with Anglo institutions only to claim financial recompense. Neither would live to see New
Mexico achieve statehood.

V. “The utmost efforts…[to] stamp me as anti-American,” 1865 - 1904.
The trajectories of Pino and Chavez diverged most sharply in the post-war period. This
divergence was likely due to a difference in their skills and desire to interact with the
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increasingly numerous and powerful Anglo population in the rapidly changing territory. Both
maintained their inherited socio-economic power as patrones through their deaths. However, the
ways in which they did so and on what geographic scale they maintained this influence varied
significantly.
From 1865 through the turn of the century, New Mexico became a hotspot for U.S.
westward expansion and a birthplace of the “Wild West” mythology. 194 The first major New
Mexican gold rush in 1860 touched off a wave of westward migration, particularly from Texas
and Missouri, that subsequent gold, copper, and silver finds in the territory spurred on after the
war. Territorial legislatures responded to the resulting Anglo dominated mining towns by
creating new counties over which Anglo migrants, rather than Nuevo Mexicano patrones, held
sway. In 1879, Wall Street capital financed the first railroad tracks in New Mexico, which
expanded into a full network of intra-state lines by 1889. Texan cattle ranchers also moved west
through New Mexico into new markets in Colorado, burdening established sheep-grazing lands
used by both Nuevo Mexicano and Navajo shepherds. Many of these migrants from the east
sought to create homesteads by pushing Hispanic New Mexicans off their Spanish land grants
using the legal system or outright violence. Wall Street land speculators and rail tycoons also
sought land for railroad expansion. For rural Nuevo Mexicanos in contested ranching, mining,
or railroad counties, this “Wild West” period proved a disruption to agricultural and pastoral
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lifeways. Meanwhile, Anglo men in law, politics, and mercantile business attempted to penetrate
urban centers like Santa Fe and Albuquerque, which had long been dominated by patrones like
Pino and Chavez.195 Political scholar Phillip Gonzales has shown that, despite this incursion,
elite Nuevo Mexicanos during this time maintained electoral control of most homeland counties
and the territorial delegate position through electoral demographics as well as conscious “powersharing” with Euro-Americans.196
The bilingual and white-passing197 J.F. Chavez employed demography, power-sharing,
and even election fraud to maintain positions of power within the nascent New Mexican branch
of the Republican Party from the war’s end through his death. His affiliations with the Santa Fe
Ring of the 1870s and his use of traditional European Enlightenment rhetoric suggest a savvy,
adaptable political character. Yet, despite cooperation with Anglo-Americans, Chavez
maintained a distinct elite Nuevo Mexicano identity based upon the masculine honor and social
obligations of patronismo. Immediately after his military discharge, Chavez took up the study
of law and was admitted to the bar, earning income as a lawyer alongside his management of the
Chavez family businesses. In 1865, Chavez ran for territorial delegate to the Thirty Ninth U.S.
Congress with the Administration Party, which supported Lincoln’s anti-slavery policies and
opposed the displacement of the Diné to Bosque Redondo. He was subsequently elected in fall
of 1865 to the office of territorial delegate, which granted speaking rights but not a vote in the
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U.S. House of Representatives.198 In 1867, J.F. Chavez ran for a second term as a candidate of
the National Union Party (a branch of the U.S. Republican party) in opposition to a Prussian U.S.
veteran, General C.P. Clever of the Constitutional Union Party. 199 Though Clever initially won,
Chavez successfully contested the victory on the basis of election fraud before the House
Committee on Elections. His success was due in part to cultivated alliances with the Radical
Republicans who controlled Congress.200 In 1869 Chavez was elected for a third term in the
post, this time as the candidate for the Republican party. It was during this final term that
Delegate Chavez spoke most vigorously in favor of statehood for New Mexico by advocating for
the New Mexican Enabling Act of March 1871. 201
Though the act failed in the U.S. House of Representatives, the manner in which Chavez
supported statehood throughout his career is informative. As Philip Gonzales has demonstrated,
J.F. Chavez deployed the language of classical enlightenment European liberalism to argue for
Nuevo Mexicano equality. Unlike more conservative opponents, including his cousin Francisco
Perea, Chavez did not argue that New Mexicans had earned equality by rejecting their past and
becoming more Anglo-American. Instead, his rhetoric applied liberal ideals of natural rights and
universal citizenship to argue that all male citizens of the territory, regardless of language or
ethnicity, should be equal under U.S. law. 202 Through the elections of the 1870s, Chavez
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refused to erase his own Spanish-Mexican heritage or that of his electorate. Instead, he asserted
that Nuevo Mexicanos did experience Euro-American discrimination on a local and national
scale. Statehood would rectify this legal inequality while allowing Hispanic New Mexico to
retain its unique cultural and social identity. In his address “To the People of New Mexico”
published in The New Mexican after his 1865 election, Chavez acknowledged that this raceconscious argument and his refusal to make Anglicization a prerequisite for statehood
engendered “the utmost efforts...to prejudice, defame, and stamp me as anti-American.”
However, Chavez saw his election as an affirmation of “this great principle--that the citizens of
the United States, in all parts of the Territory thereof possess equal privileges and rights...to draw
a line of distinction between citizens is unjust, illiberal and contrary to the spirit and purity of our
institutions.”203 Chavez’s self-identification as both a person of Mexican heritage and a U.S.
citizen echoed his wartime complaints to Anglo Union officers: he was proud to be called a
Mexican, but refused any attachment of inferiority to the identity. Moreover, his arguments
reveal that he saw Nuevo Mexicano citizens as fully equal to Anglo-American colonizers, not as
their foils or mimics. Chavez needed this Nuevo Mexicano identity in order to maintain his
unique patrón role. If Hispanic New Mexican-ness was subsumed by an imitation of eastern
Protestant Anglo-ness, the cultural and historical heritage that legitimated the rule of the
patrones would disappear.
J.F. Chavez lost his fourth bid for territorial delegate in 1871 to the Nuevo Mexicano
Democrat José M. Gallegos, who attacked Chavez’s failure to gain statehood for the territory. 204
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Despite losing the delegate office, Chavez remained a Republican powerhouse in northern New
Mexican politics for the next thirty years. In 1872, Bernalillo, Valencia, and Socorro counties
elected him as their district attorney. Beginning in 1875, he served fifteen sessions on the
territorial council for Valencia and Torrance counties, during eight of which he was elected as
council president. During his participation in the territory’s 1889 constitutional convention, the
newly-organized “Chaves County” was named in his honor. Governor Miguel Otero II
appointed him Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1901 and the territorial historian in 1903.
Historians and contemporaries went so far as to call Chavez the “Father of New Mexican
Statehood” and the territory’s most stalwart Republican.205
As a politician, however, J.F. Chavez’s hands were not always clean, largely due to his
variable collaboration with the notorious Santa Fe Ring. The Ring, or “La Rueda”, was a
dominant political clique in post-war New Mexico organized predominantly around two
Missouri-born Anglo lawyers, Stephen Elkins and Thomas Catron. During the Ring’s three
decades of political influence (ca. 1865-1912), they participated in land speculation, false
government contracts, and corruption involving the cattle, railroad, and mining industries.
Scholar of the Santa Fe Ring David L. Caffey identified J.F. Chavez as “a sometime confederate
of the Ring.”206 Political rivals frequently accused Chavez of fixing the polls in his native
Valencia county in favor of Republican candidates backed by this clique. 207
Chavez’s strategies for interacting with the Ring echoed his wartime patterns of
conditional cooperation with Anglos to serve his own interest in preserving the patrón class.
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Unlike less popular Ring-affiliates, Chavez wielded enough independent political power to
choose which Ring initiatives to support or oppose in the territorial legislature based on his own
political interests. During an 1884 meeting of the constitutional convention for New Mexican
statehood, for example, Chavez led a coalition of politicians in favor of moving the territory’s
capital from Santa Fe to Albuquerque in seizing control of the council session. After pro-Santa
Fe politicians of the Ring, including Catron, regained control of the convention by gubernatorial
intervention, Chavez continued to oppose their actions. The convention controversy
demonstrates the high level of self-interest that motivated Chavez’s actions. The familial
network of social obligation, strategic kinship ties, and landed wealth that situated Chavez as a
patrón was based around Albuquerque. He exercised the strongest influence in Valencia,
Bernalillo, Socorro, and Torrance counties, as shown by his ability to dictate the election results
in those counties.208 The movement of the state capital to Albuquerque (in Bernalillo County)
would therefore have increased Chavez’s own political power and, perhaps, improved the
position of his local electorate. Whether Chavez saw his intentions to capture the council as
genuinely favorable to his constituents or entirely self-serving is unclear; what Chavez did prove
was his ability to move in and out of the Santa Fe Ring at will to protect his own status. 209
J.F. Chavez also integrated with Anglos in the territory to further his own ends in his
personal life. His first wife, the Canadian-born Anglican Mary Bowie whom Chavez had
married in San Francisco before the war, died in 1874, leaving Chavez free to pursue a more
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socially-connected spouse.210 He chose Josephine Whittington, the New Mexican-born daughter
of a Nuevo Mexicano mother, Maria Paz Jaramillo, and a merchant freighter from Maryland,
James Whittington.211 By 1880, Maria Paz was widowed and by 1885 established a boarding
house in the town of Los Lunas in which Josephine worked until her marriage. 212 She married
José Francisco in 1892 and had one daughter, Rafaelita, in their Valencia county home the
following year.213 Like José Francisco, Josephine was a member of the Valencia county rico
class, though she was more than twenty years his junior. More importantly, Josephine stood as a
product of the cultural mixing between Anglo and Hispanic New Mexicans. She could serve as a
suitable partner for Chavez in settings dominated by members of either group. Chavez could not
have married a more perfect example of his successful merger into both worlds.
While J.F. Chavez deftly navigated the multi-ethnic political circuit around Albuquerque,
Nicolás Pino returned to the more traditionally isolated lifestyle of the pre-annexation Hispanic
New Mexican elite in the town of Galisteo in Santa Fe county. A year after the war’s end, the
U.S. Postmaster General appointed the forty-seven-year-old Pino as postmaster of Santa Fe’s
Juana Lopez Post Office in December 1866. 214 Postmasters often held the office as a side job to
their main occupation, as was the case for Nicolás Pino. Turn-of-the-century historian Ralph
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Twitchell informs that Pino also served three terms on the legislative council of New Mexico, as
president in 1869 and then again in 1873 and 1878. 215 No other primary or secondary sources
could be found to corroborate this fact. This suggests that, if Nicolás Pino did serve on the
territorial council, he did so quietly and without the wide influence that put J.F. Chavez’s name
in every territorial paper.

Nicolás, along with most of the male members of the Pino clan,

remained employed chiefly as hacendados, managers of ranching and agriculture on a specific
hacienda, through the end of the century.216 This was a far more traditional lifeway of the
patrones than the legal profession that J.F. Chavez pursued.
The familial structure and marriage patterns of the Pino family likewise prove more
similar to the Spanish and Mexican eras than those of the Chavez family. Nicolás remained
married to his Mexican-born wife, Juana Rascón, for the rest of his life. All his children who
married selected partners from the established Nuevo Mexicano ruling elite. 217 As shown in
Chapter I, such marriages among the closely-related elite families of Nuevo México were the
norm before annexation. While Chavez departed from this pattern by marrying into an
ethnically-mixed family, other Nuevo Mexicano ricos like Pino apparently valued the insularity
that intra-elite marriages provided.
In a related adherence to tradition, most of Pino’s sons and unmarried daughters remained
on or near the main ranch in Galisteo through middle age, just as Nicolás and Juana had lived at
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his mother’s property through 1850. As a result, the 1880 U.S. Census indicated up to nineteen
people, or three separate families, living on Pino’s ranch. All three of the male heads of those
families were listed as “farmers” of the land. Strangely, one of these three families had the
Anglo surname “Adams” and were all born in the Midwestern United States. Thirty-five-yearold father John Adams along with his eighteen year-old wife Eddie and five year-old son, also
Eddie, were listed, like the Pino family, as “white”. They do not appear at the Ranch in the 1885
Territorial Census. This suggests that the Adams may have been among the poor white migrants
from the Eastern U.S. who sought better fortunes in the West after the war, but lacked the means
to purchase their own lands. Perhaps Nicolás Pino employed the family as tenant farmers for a
few years, and thus incorporated the newcomers into extant practices of debt peonage labor. In
this way, even as Anglo-Americans entered his sphere of influence, the Pino patrón would have
forced the outsiders to conform to his hacendado lifestyle, rather than change his own practices
to become more Anglo.
Participation in the centuries-old practices of Indian borderlands slavery serves as the
final contrast between the more integrated Chavez and the traditionalist Pino. By 1900, J.F.
Chavez and his wife Josephine had only one servant in their five-person home: Marcelino
Whittington, a sixteen-year-old male “day laborer” listed as white. 218 Marcelino had been a twoyear-old resident of Josephine’s mother’s boarding house in the 1885 Territorial Census. This
suggests that her mother may have informally adopted Marcelino Whittington, then passed him
on to her daughter to be Josephine and J. Francisco’s unofficial ward. Though it is possible
Marcelino was of some indigenous heritage, he was not identified as such by any census. The
fact that he could read and write supports the conclusion that Marcelino was more of an
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informally adopted ward than a slave.219 The teenager’s presence in the house suggests that,
while J.F. Chavez continued the Nuevo Mexicano practice of adoptions and extended kinship
networks, he separated his family from the mechanisms of American Indian slavery. Recall that
Chavez had at least one enslaved Indian “servant” in his household in 1860 and permitted further
enslavement during the Bosque Redondo campaign at Fort Wingate. Nevertheless, he seems to
have ended his participation in the practice by 1900, at which point Euro-Americans considered
the dying institution to be antiquated and barbaric. 220 It seems likely the adaptive J.F. Chavez
did so to preserve his reputation as a modern politician and curry favor with Anglo elites.
Furthermore, Chavez’s bourgeois employment as a lawyer and politician, rather than a reliance
on his family’s hacienda, freed him from the need for many agricultural laborers.
By contrast, the hacendado Nicolás Pino continued to hold multiple “servants”, at least
one of whom was Indian, on his Galisteo ranch through 1885. In 1880, the Californian-born
Mohave woman, Vicenta, still lived as a “servant” on the ranch she had occupied since at least
1860. At thirty-three years-old, Vicenta was still unable to read or write. Two other men
designated to be white were listed as illiterate servants in the household. 221 All three
disappeared by the 1885 Territorial Census, when one man listed as “white” was the only servant
in the home.222 The persistent captivity of Vicenta and the revolving coterie of servants on Pino’s
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Ranch demonstrates Nicolás Pino’s deep commitment to the pre-war and pre-annexation
hacendado lifestyle. Even as the territory shifted around him, the sixty-year-old patrón of the
Nuevo Mexicano landed elite worked to keep his home a beacon of traditional Hispanic New
Mexican social and economic power encapsulated in the continued practice of Indian
borderlands slavery.223
Even as the ways in which Nicolás Pino and José Francisco Chavez responded to AngloAmerican settlement differed, the two men had one common motive to interact with the U.S.
federal government: military pensions. In doing so, both patrones implicitly recognized the
sovereignty of the U.S. over New Mexico even as they considered themselves culturally
separate. On May 19, 1890, “José F. Chaves” filed for a U.S. Civil War military pension, noting
his rank and service in two different regiments. 224 Oddly, no Civil War pension application
exists for Nicolás Pino, possibly due to his service in a catch-all militia unit rather than as a
volunteer. In July 1890 Pino did file for a pension as a veteran of the U.S.-Mexican War,
despite his part in the plotted overthrow of the U.S. military government during this very war.
Pino listed himself among “[Colonel] St. Vrain’s Indpt los N. Mex. Vols” without rank or date of
enlistment.225 As discussed in Chapter I, Pino fought on the side of the U.S. for a portion of the
war after being captured in December 1846 and forced to take an oath of allegiance that betrayed
his brothers. The application demonstrates that even Pino, who had violently contested U.S. rule
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during the U.S.-Mexican War, tacitly accepted Washington’s control in order to collect what he
felt the government owed him over forty years later. Though millions of other U.S. veterans
made claims on the federal government following the upheaval of the Civil War, those made by
the Nuevo Mexicano rico class stand out given the socio-cultural context of the territory. 226
Pension-seekers like Pino and Chavez indicated that, even as the social, cultural, and economic
foundations of their patrón status remained un-Anglicized, they accepted federal institutions that
were to their benefit. Being a patrón in late nineteenth-century New Mexico, therefore, did not
necessitate a complete rejection of all things Anglo. Instead, patrones who integrated a careful
selection of ideas, goods, and people from east of the Mississippi into their expressions of
patronismo could bolster their own status without undermining its traditional foundations.
Both Pino and Chavez died at an elderly age in the territory of their birth, still holding
this high status. Twitchell gives Nicolás Pino’s date of death in November 1896 at the age of
seventy-seven, and informs that he was buried in the Galisteo village cemetery. 227 Perhaps due
to the remote location of his ranch and the quietness of what may be presumed to be a natural
death, no death certificates, obituaries, or burial records could be found to corroborate Twitchell.
However, at least one of Nicolás’s daughters is buried in Old Galisteo Cemetery along with his
daughter-in-law.228
J.F. Chavez, on the other hand, did not go quietly. He was assassinated while eating
dinner at the home of a friend at Pino’s Wells in Torrance County, shot dead through a window
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at the age of seventy-one on November 26, 1904. He had just been re-elected to the territorial
council for his sixteenth session.229 No one was ever convicted for the murder, though Domingo
Valles, the relative of a cattle thief, was arrested a few days afterwards, only to be tried and
found not guilty of the crime in August, 1907. 230 Chavez was so noteworthy that for several
years after his death, the press continued to connect any prominent men of “desperate character”
with the crime.231 One obituary identified Chavez as “one of the oldest and best known citizens
of the territory, having been prominently identified with its history for more than forty years,
during which time he held many important positions of honor and trust.” 232 José Francisco
Chavez was buried at the National Cemetery in Santa Fe. Notably, his headstone reflects the
masculine honor of his military service over any of his many political exploits. Its inscription
simply reads, “José F. Chavez, Lt. Col, 1 Regt, N Mex Cav.” 233

Conclusion
When taken in tandem and in their entirety, the lives of Nicolás Bautista Pino and José
Francisco Chavez are stories that refuse to be easily located along the spectrums between
resistance and adaptation, change and continuity, traditionalism and modernism. They, and the
small Hispanic New Mexican rico class to which they belonged, cannot be neatly characterized
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as entirely compliant with or resistant to U.S. colonialism. Nor may they be classified as either
unchanging Spanish-colonial antiques or as completely Anglicized integrationists. On the
contrary, Pino and Chavez continued to act on and claim a distinct, honorable Mexican identity
even as they increased their interactions with the U.S. federal government through the Civil War
and in the decades afterwards. Both found conflict with Anglo-Americans that originated from
this identity. Chavez bore his out through the written word during and after the Civil War, while
Pino plotted a political coups during the 1846 U.S. invasion. Yet, in their later lives, both men
also recognized the U.S. government’s sovereignty over the territory and claimed federal benefits
in the form of military pensions. Even as Pino maintained a more traditional hacendado lifestyle
than J.F. Chavez in the postwar period, he still interacted with new federal institutions such as
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and U.S. postal system. Converesley, Chavez, while
immensely adept at navigating Anglo politics to suit his own ends, never claimed to be an
Anglo-American politician. In fact, he confounded attempts to separate him from his Hispanic
New Mexican electorate by publicly defending the honor of Nuevo Mexicano Civil War veterans
and refusing to erase his Mexican heritage in arguments for statehood.
What links the stories of Pino and Chavez, then, is the need to maintain their unique
identity as patrones in their Nuevo Mexicano communities and, in so doing, maintain the
established social structures of these communities. This patrón identity was as much about
wealth and political power as it was about masculine honor, claiming centuries-old roots in the
place of one’s familial land grant, and defending one’s extended family from both Protestant and
Indian “heretics”. Pino and Chavez, like their fathers and grandfathers before them, derived and
maintained their legitimacy as patrones not only from their inherited Spanish land grant but from
peons seeking out their patronage, an extended Catholic kinship network, the subjugation of
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indigenous people, and magnanimity towards the less fortunate in their communities of
influence.
All these sources of power shifted during the nineteenth-century, but did not vanish.
Rather, the detailed examination of two people who sought this power shows that, as the world
changed under the feet of the Pino and Chavez patriarchs, their duties as patrones could and did
take different forms. On the cusp of U.S. annexation and the possible destruction of the Nuevo
Mexicano patrón/peon system, this position motivated Pino and other prominent men to resist
U.S. domination. At the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War, mandates of masculine honor
originating in traditions of frontier warfare required Pino and Chavez to enlist as officers. In the
economic and political turbulence of the postwar period, patronismo meant adapting to U.S.
federal power structures while simultaneously maintaining the family’s economic dominance
over inherited lands. Chavez took this one step further and became a patrón not only of his
Bernalillo County hacienda, but of all of Hispanic New Mexico, a fact shown most clearly in his
appointments to the territory-wide posts rather than local councils. In the struggle to maintain
their culturally distinct socioeconomic position, then, both Nicolás Pino and José Francisco
Chavez succeeded, though they did so on differing terms.
We are left with the lives of two men who represent one elite facet of a Hispanic New
Mexican community that had its own lexicon of unique, culturally contingent responses to
annexation, foreign warfare, and economic change. Their stories demonstrate that this
community, to use the words of Mexican microhistorian Luis González, “se sab[ía] una y distinta
(knew it was singular and distinct).”234 The national allegiances, values, and strategies of
Nicolás Pino and José Chavez help reveal this distinctive and often-neglected polity on the North
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American landscape. This, in turn, contributes to a more nuanced interpretation of pivotal
nineteenth-century events that have been understood as having only two dichotomous groups of
historical actors; not all communities on the North American continent fit easily into the Civil
War binary of “North vs. South” or the neat division between “U.S. colonizer vs. Native
colonized” in histories of U.S. Manifest Destiny. The story of the lives of Pino and Chavez show
that, while occupying this liminal space between colonizer and colonized, white and non-white,
Southern and Northern, Mexican and American, Nuevo Mexicano elites contested the overrun of
all their country.
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Appendix I: Maps
Figure 1:
“Our Western Territories, 1854”, Nathaniel Wright Stephenson, An American History (Boston,
MA: Ginn and Company, 1913), 391. Courtesy of the private collection of Roy
Winkelman. Reproduced by Maps Etc., Florida Center for Education Technology,
University of Southern Florida College of Education, 2009,
https://etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/9900/9948/9948.htm . Accessed March 29, 2018.
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Figure 2:
“The Southwestern Defense System Before the Civil War.” National Park Service. Historical
Handbook No. 35 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior,
1962). Reproduced at “Fort Union - National Monument”, National Park Service
Historical Handbooks website, 2002.
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/hh/35/hh35l.htm Accessed March 16,
2018.
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Figure 3:
“The Southwestern Defense System After the Civil War.” National Park Service. Historical
Handbook No. 35 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior,
1962). Reproduced at “Fort Union - National Monument”, National Park Service
Historical Handbooks website, 2002.
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/hh/35/hh35l.htm Accessed March 16,
2018.
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Figure 4:
“Map of the states and territories of the United States as it was from February 1863 to March
1863.” Created by User:Golbez, Wikimedia Commons, July 29, 2007.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_States_1863-02-1863-03.png Accessed
April 11, 2018.
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